from some inward active principle or anticipation in the man, which the brute hath not."

§. 253. Further remarks of the same writer on this subject.

"But I shall yet further illustrate this business, (says this eloquent writer near the conclusion of the same chap. ter,) that the mind may actively comprehend more in the outward objects of sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively received and impressed from them, by another instance. Suppose a learned written or printed volume held before the eye of a brute-creature or illiterate person; either of them will passively receive all that.is impressed upon sense from those delineations; to whom there will be nothing but several scrawls or lines of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man, that hath inward anticipations of learning in him, look upon them he will immediately have another comprehension of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts presently represented to his mind from them; he will see heaven, carth, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elements, in those inky delineations; he will read profound theorems of philosophy, geometry, astronomy in them, learn a great deal of new knowledge from them that he never understood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the composer of them. Not that all this was passively stamped upon his soul by sense from those characters; (for sense, as I said before, can perceive nothing here but inky scrawls and the intelligent reader will many times correct his copy, finding erratas in it ;) but because his mind was before furnished with certain inward anticipations, that such characters signify the elements of certain sounds, those sounds certain notions or cogitations of the mind; and because he hath an active power of exciting any such cogitations within himself, he reads in those sensible delineations, the passive stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them, not as infused into his mind from those sensible characters, but by reason of those hints and significations thereby proposed

to it, accidentally kindled, awakened and excited in it: for all, but the phantasms of black inky strokes and figures, arises from the inward activity of his own mind. Wherefore this instance in itself shews, how the activity of the mind may comprehend more in and from sensible objects, than is passively imprinted by them upon sense."

§. 257. Knowledge begins in the senses, but has internal

accessions.

In order to have a clear understanding of the particular topic before us, let us briefly advert to certain general vieys already more or less attended to, having a conection with it. In making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an obvious consideration, that a distinction may be drawn between the soul contemplated in itself, and its acts, or states, or the knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, therefore naturally arises, Under what circumstances the acquisition of knowledge begins?

Now this is the very question, which has already been considered; nor can it be deemed necessary to repeat here the considerations, which have been brought up in reference to it. It is enough to express our continued reliance on the general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is possible to ascertain them on a subject of so much difficulty, that the beginnings of thought and feeling and knowledge are immediately subsequent to certain affections of those bodily organs, which we call the SENIn other words, were it not for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would have remained folded up in all probability, and have never been redeemed from a state of fruitless inaction.

SES.

Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke sensation, may justly be considered the occasion or the introductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount of it in its ultimate progress is to be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with

truth, is, that the mind receives the earliest parts of its ideas by means of the senses, and that, in consequence of having received these elementary thoughts, all its powers become rapidly and fully operative.

And here we come to the SECOND great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them from those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called, in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of reflection, or, to use a phraseology embracing all possible cases, ideas of INTERNAL ORIgin.

These two sources of human thought the Internal and External, however they may have been confounded by the writers last alluded to, are entirely distinct. The ideas, which arise in the mind, solely from the fact of the previous existence of certain mental operations, could not have been suggested by any thing, which takes place in the external world, independently of those operations. Of this class, some instances, with illustrations of the same, may properly be mentioned here.

§. 258. Instances of notions, which have an internal origin.

Among other notions, which are to be ascribed to the second great source, are those, expressed by the terms, thinking, doubting, believing, and certainty.—It is a matter of internal observation, (that is, of consciousness or of reflection, which are synonymous with internal observation,) that the mind does not and cannot for any length of time remain inactive. Hence there is occasion given for the origin of that idea, which we denominate THINKING.

The notion which we thus call, is framed by the mind under these circumstances; the name is given, and nobody is ignorant as to what is meant. But then it is to be marked that its origin is wholly internal; it is not an object of touch, or taste, or sight; it is to be ascribed to the mind itself alone and to its inherent activity, unaided by the senses or by any thing operating upon them.

Again, in the examination of some topic, which is

proposed for discussion, a proposition is stated with little or no evidence attending it, and the mind, in reference to that proposition, is brought into a position, to which we give the name of doubting. It is by no means easy, or rather it is impossible, to trace this idea directly to the senses. All we can say of it, is, that it has its origin within, and necessarily exists immediately subsequent to certain other mental states, of which we are conscious.

But then in this very instance, if the evidence be considerably increased, the mental estimation, which we form, is altered in regard it, and to this new state of the mind we give the name of belief or believing. And in case the evidence of the proposition is of a higher and more decided character, there then arises another state of the mind, which we denominate certainty.

The ideas of virtue and vice, of justice and injustice, of order, proportion, similitude, truth, wisdom, obligation, succession, cause, effect, and many others, have a like origin; at least there are none of them to be ascribed directly and exclusively to the senses.-It is cheerfully granted, that, in determining this point, it is proper to refer to the common experience of mankind, and to rely upon it. But it is believed in all these instances, (certainly in the most of them,) such a reference will be amply decisive.

Let it then be left to the candid internal examination of each individual, to determine, Whether a distinction be not rightly drawn between the origin of these ideas, and that of those, which we attribute to the senses, such as red, blue, sweet, fragrant, bitter, hard, extended, &c.? On this question, it is thought, that in general there can be but one answer, although some minds of superior order have from time to time been betrayed into errour on this subject through the love of excessive simplification.

Hence it is distinctly to be kept in mind, that there are two sources of thought and knowledge. An affection of the senses by means of external objects is the immediate occasion of one portion; the constitution of the mind and its operations are the occasions or source of the other. The one source is called External; the other Internal.

CHAPTER SECOND.

SUGGESTION.

§. 259. Import of the term suggestion and its application in' Reid and Stewart.

SOME of the cases of thought and knowledge, which the mind becomes possessed of in itself, without the direct aid of the senses, are to be ascribed to Suggestion. This word, in its application here, is used merely to express a simple, but important fact, viz, That the mind, by its own activity and vigour, gives rise to certain thoughts. Without any mixture of hypothesis, or any qualifying intimation whatever, it gives the fact, and that is all. The use of this word, as applicable to the origin of a portion of human knowledge, is distinctly proposed by Dr. Reid. In his Inquiry into the Human Mind, (Chap. 11. §. 7,) he speaks of certain notions, (for instance, those of existence, mind, person, &c,) as the "judgments of nature, judg ments not got by comparing ideas, and perceiving agreements and disagreements, but immediately inspired by our constitution." Pursuing this train of thought, he further remarks; "It is incumbent on those, who think that these are not natural principles, [that is, notions called forth within us, independently of reasoning,] to show how we can otherwise get the notion of mind, and its faculties. Again, immediately after, he ascribes those notions, which cannot be attributed directly to the senses