hundreds and thousands of times have felt the Divine authority and love of your Saviour weighing in your mind against the fascinations of a sinful state; and just so many times you have, by distinct acts of your will, chosen to go on in your unconverted state. Your present condition, then, is one of much guilt; there is a vast aggravation of criminality in those acts of your will which have decided against the light of truth, against the plain commands of your Saviour, against the powerful attractions of his love. It is said, "That servant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes," Luke xii. 47. Can you deny that a clear case has been made out against you of a resolute and fixed purpose of will to remain opposed to the command of your Saviour. He says, Repent." You have virtually said, "I will not." He says, "Be converted." You say, "I will not be converted." And on this ground, therefore, you stand clearly and fully convicted before God.

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6. I am well aware that many of the unconverted, and especially such as have enjoyed Christian instruction, are disposed to plead in extenuation of their unwillingness, that they cannot give themselves grace; and that such is the nature of their sinful state, that they cannot change for the better, and that they cannot will otherwise than they do. I believe this is a very prevalent excuse with the unconverted of a certain class, and that it is an indication of a state of mind greatly hardened and alienated from the fear of God. This is an attempt to throw off the responsibility from themselves, and to insinuate that their being unconverted is rather their misfortune than their sin.

If this is the view or feeling of any reader of this treatise, I hope he will patiently allow me to expostulate with him upon the extreme improbability of the issue of his case proving as he may expect; for this reason, that the Scripture no where admits, that the unwillingness of the sinner is to be palliated or excused in any degree, or charged upon any one but himself. So that, supposing his plea even appeared plausible, and did not admit of any satisfactory reply on the ground of reason, still Scripture is so much, so universally against the plea, that he might, on that ground alone, be sure there was a fallacy in it; and that if it were acted upon, and looked to for a valid defence at last, it would utterly fail. But the very fact of God's threatening those that refuse, of his having severely punished many who have done so, his assurance that they will at last be without excuse; and the further fact, that we often see a fearful retribution, through the power of a guilty conscience, inflicted upon those who have refused, in their own agonizing sense of the moral wrong that they have perpetrated in refusing; these considerations alone would form a strong presumptive evidence, amounting to a sufficient proof, that there must be a delusion some where in that man's mind, who feels disposed to throw the responsibility of continuing in impenitence from himself, either upon the laws of his nature, or the sovereignty of God. Such considerations might be sufficient to induce him to abandon so insecure a refuge for his conscience, and lead him to the conclusion, that God will assuredly be justified when he speaketh, and be clear when he judgeth, Psa. li. 4.

But may not the unconverted himself perceive

the very essence of the fallacy he indulges? Is there not room for a direct appeal to his own consciousness? He knows that he cannot sincerely plead any constraint upon his will: that which arises from the evil habits he has indulged, is properly no constraint, but a cherished desire; no violence done to his will, but a distinct preference the will itself gives to that of which he affects to complain as a grievance and a necessity. Is he not conscious of the very same freedom of choice in rejecting the command of God, as in complying with any sinful propensity? Is he not just as much at liberty when he prefers to continue in his unconverted state, swayed as he is by the motives which incline to a life of sin, as when he resolves to eat his food, to attend to his business, or to pursue his pleasures? Surely he must admit, that he is conscious of acting in all these cases under the impulse of the same free-will. What right, then, can he have to select one case, and endeavour in that to rid himself of all responsibility, by pleading the weakness of his will to do what is right, and its strength to do what is wrong? If he is a free agent in one of these acts, so he is in all. The bad inclination, and the bad habit, is no extenuation of the deed; because still it is a deed of choice, and not of constraint against choice; and of this he is, and must be, conscious. He cannot but be convinced, in defiance of all sophistry and all palliation, that he really has chosen, hitherto, the course he has pursued; he has wilfully resisted God's command, and Christ's entreaty, and just as wilfully preferred an unconverted state.

The extreme absurdity of expecting that he will be able to justify himself by the plea supposed, may be still further evinced, by just taking up any

other case in which the depravity of the will has been displayed by the breach of moral obligations. How absurd it would appear, even to the party with whom I am now reasoning, to hear a disobedient servant, or an undutiful child, reply, when charged with the violation of duty, "Very true; I do not deny the charge, but my will was indisposed to comply; and, you know, I could not help my will being opposed to yours! s!" Suppose a criminal, arraigned for robbery or murder, arguing in his defence upon the same principle-"I did not choose to be honest;" and, "I know I willed to commit that murder, and I could not help doing according to my will." Now, all these cases would appear the more aggravated by the distinct acknowledgment of the will having deliberately chosen so to act; and every impartial man, instead of admitting that such a plea removed responsibility, would say, that the criminality was hereby made the more obvious, that the guilt was placed precisely at that very point, and that this wilfulness was the very thing which constituted the guilt, for without that there could have been none.

The unconverted person, who pleads his inability, or impotency of will, to choose God's commands, or to submit his heart to the authority of the Saviour in the business of repentance and faith, should remember, that he is pleading nothing to the point, nothing that God either will or can admit, or ought to admit. He ought to be aware, that he is not pleading that he had no will of his own in this business; if he could do that justly, it might avail; but his whole plea is, that, with the natural power to will, he had an inclination to will what his conscience and judgment told him was evil. This is, therefore, no excuse in the sight of God,

but the very highest proof of guilt. He labours under a grievous fallacy, therefore, who imagines. that he can make out a valid extenuation of his impenitence and unbelief, by referring to this subtle question of his will. He would do much better by humbly acknowledging that all the guilt lies upon his own head; and that, when he shall appear in the judgment, he will undoubtedly be speechless before that righteous Judge, who now commandeth all men every where to repent," Acts xvii. 30; and who will then say, "These mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and slay them before me,' Luke xix. 27.

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Let me faithfully forewarn the reader, that all his excuses will be found a refuge of lies. All his metaphysical sophistry is opposed to the plain, common-sense view of the case. Facts are before reasoning, and more weighty than opinion; and he may rest assured, that the repose he seeks for in these false refuges of a corrupt and perverted reasoning, will be disturbed at last by the stern reality of his condemnation. "The bed is

shorter than that a man can stretch himself on it: and the covering narrower than that he can wrap himself in it," Isa. xxviii. 20.

7. It is, however, necessary to observe and point out here an opposite error, into which others fall, an error of presumption, no less fatal, and, perhaps, even more prevalent, than the one just combated: it consists in supposing, because they feel they have a will of their own, they can direct it to the discharge of this spiritual duty of repentance and faith at any time; and so they defer the duty under the false notion, that when they choose the great work can be done. But this notion is just as