agency of the God of this world, blinding the minds of them that believe not, ii. Cor. iv. 4. It is wilful ignorance, occasioned by their loving darkness, and hating the light, John iii. 19, 20, and so they are represented as having closed their eyes lest they should see. Matt. xiii. 15. From this it appears that unbelief is founded not merely on simple ignorance, but aversion from the things of God,

"Now if unbelief be a sin, and seated in the depravity of the heart, as has been shown, it necessarily follows that faith, its opposite, must be a duty," [and have its seat also in the heart.] Sermons, pp. 40, 41. The words added in crotchets merely go to draw the conclusion; and whether it be fairly drawn, let the reader judge.

Mr. M. cannot consistently object that by allowing unbelief to be seated in the heart, he did not mean to grant that it was seated in the will, since his whole argument asserts the contrary; and he elsewhere says, "the scriptures always represent the regenerating and sanctifying influences of the spirit as exerted upon the heart; which includes not only the understanding, but the will and affections, or the prevalent inclinations and dispositions of the soul. Works, vol. II. p. 91.

I had said 'I can scarcely conceive of a truth more self-evident than this, that God's commands extend only to that which comes under the influence of the will." *** Mr. M. allows this to be" a principle on which my main argu

ments seem to be grounded." It became him therefore, if he were able, to give it a solid answer. And what is his answer? "It is so far, he says, from being self-evident, that to him it does not appear evident at all." He should instance then in something which is allowed not to come under the influence of the will, but which nevertheless is a duty. Instead of this, he says, the commands of God "extend not only to what comes under the influence of the will, but also to the belief of the revealed truths and motives by which the will itself is influenced."* But who does not perceive that this is proving a thing by itself; or alleging that as evidence which is the very point in dispute?

The argument was this:-all duty comes under the influence of the will-But faith is a duty-Therefore faith comes under the influence of the will. To have overturned the first of these propositions, which is that which he calls in question, he should have shewn by something else than belief, something that is allowed not to come under the influence of the will, that it may nevertheless be commanded of God. But this he has not shewn, nor attempted to shew.

All that Mr. M'LEAN has done towards auswering this argument is by labouring to fasten certain absurdities upon it. "I believing God with the understanding (he says) be not a duty, it must be either because he has not given a clear revelation of the truth, and supported it

* Reply, p. 70.

with sufficient evidence, or if he has, that there is no moral turpitude in mental error."*

By this way of writing it would seem as if I pleaded for men's believing without their understanding, of which I certainly have no idea, any more than of their disbelieving without it. F hold no more in respect of faith, than Mr. M. does in respect of unbelief, namely, that it does not pertain to the understanding only. The greatest evidence or authority cannot oblige us to that in which we are absolutely involuntary. God commands us to love him with all our powers, but not beyond our powers. To love him with all our hearts includes every thing that depends upon disposition, even the bowing of our understandings to revealed truth, instead of proudly rejecting it; but that is all. So far as knowledge or belief is absolutely involuntary, we might as well ascribe duty to the convulsive motions of the body as to them. And as to

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"mental error," if it could be proved to be merely mental; that is, not to arise from indolence, prejudice, aversion, or any other evil disposition, it would be innocent. Christ did not criminate the Jews for simply misunderstanding him, but refers to the cause of that misunderstanding as the ground of censure. Why do ye not understand my speech? because ye cannot hear my word."-That is, because they were utterly averse to it. Mr. M'LEAN acknowledges as much as this when he speaks of the neglect of the great salvation being the effect of " "perverse John viii. 43.

* Reply, p. 76.

ness, and aversion, and therefore inexcusable." What is this but admitting that if it arose from simple ignorance it would be excusable?

Another consequence which Mr. M. endeavours to fasten upon this principle is, "If faith be not a duty unless it be influenced by the moral state of the heart, then it can be no man's duty to believe the testimony of God concerning his son till he is previously possessed of that moral state."* But if this consequence were just, it would follow from his own principles as well as mine. He considers the illumination of the Holy Spirit, as necessary to believing; but does he infer that till such illumination take place, it is not a sinner's duty to believe? He also considers repentance as the fruit of faith; but does he infer that till a sinner is in possession of faith, it is not his duty to repent? The truth is, that God in requiring any one duty, requires that, as to the state of the mind, be it repentance or faith, or what it may, which is necessary to it. It was not the duty of Absalom to ask pardon of David without feeling sorry for his offence: but it does not follow that while his heart was hardened he was under no obligation to ask pardon. He was under obligation to both; and so are men with regard to believing the gospel. They are obliged to be of an open, upright, unprejudiced mind, and so to believe the truth.

If faith be a duty, believing is a holy exercise of the mind; for what else is holiness but a con

* Reply p. 73.

formity of mind to the revealed will of God? Mr. M. allows of a belief which is "merely natural," and that it has "no holiness in it." He also allows that that which has the promise of salvation is holy. So far then we seem to be agreed. Yet when he comes to state wherein its holiness consists, he seems to resolve every thing into the cause, and the nature of the truth believed.* Each of these indeed afford proof of the holy nature of faith: but to say that it consists in either, is to place the nature of a thing in its cause, and in the object on which it terminates. The objects of belief are exactly the same as those of unbelief: but it will not be alleged, I presume, that unbelief is a holy exercise!

The sum is, Mr. M. thinks he ascribes duty and holiness to faith; but his hypothesis is inconsistent with both. And this is all that I ever meant to charge him with. It never was in my heart to "impeach his honesty," though he has more than once impeached mine.

Thirdly, On this principle, calls, invitations, and exhortations to believe have no place in the christian ministry.-To call, invite, or exhort a man to that in which his will has no concern is self-evident absurdity. Every man must feel it if he only make the experiment. Mr. SANDEMAN is aware of this, and therefore utterly gives up the practice, declaring that the whole of what he has to offer is evidence. "I would set before him (the sinner) all the evidence fur