adds any thing to the ingenious observations and speculations of Hartley, in his chapter on the Deduction of Rules for the ascertainment of Truth, and advancement of Knowledge, from the mathematical Methods of considering Quantity. Mr. Dugald Stewart, in the Preliminary Dissertation to his Philosophical Essays, was pleased to sneer at some of the most refined and natural conclusions of that great and good philosopher, Hartley, in the chapter referred to, and to consider them as evidence of the unsoundness of his understanding. But Mr. Stewart is very often unfortunate in his selection of the sentiments of the greatest English metaphysicians, which he marks for peculiar reprobation and contempt.

I have now brought together, and laid before the reader, some thoughts which have occurred to me when reading the more popular scientific publications of the day. I am not without hope of awakening the attention of a few, into whose hands these pages may fall, to the contents and merits of authors whose works they may not already suffi

ciently appreciate, but which it is good "to feed upon, as insects on a leaf, till the whole heart be coloured with the fibre." The reader who wishes to see one of the best examples which our times have afforded of strictly logical or demonstrative reasoning applied to moral and metaphysical subjects, will do well to study the work of Mr. John Austin, if he is not already acquainted with it, entitled, "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined," being the substance of lectures delivered at the University of London as Professor of Jurisprudence. Contrary to the practice of those numerous writers who confound that of which they are treating with every thing else with which it can, by possibility, be confounded, Mr. Austin carefully distinguishes his subject from every thing with which it is, howsoever remotely, related. He is one of the few writers who does not fear to repeat himself, so much as to be misunderstood by his reader. He would rather give you a whole sentence two or three times over, than introduce a pronoun whose antecedent might be doubtful or nonexistent. He seeks not, by

showy phrase, to impose on the understanding of his reader, or to smooth over with received verbiage the difficulties of his subject and the absence of thought; and if he sometimes wearies with the repetition of a lengthened phrase, for which a convenient abbreviation might have been advantageously adopted, we could forgive much more than this to a writer who feels so acutely the audacity of the paradox, "that men really should think distinctly and speak with a meaning." As it bears very closely, indeed, upon the topic discussed in these pages, and as the matter is itself of the highest importance in connexion with ethical inquiries, I shall not scruple to close this essay with the following extract from Mr. Austin's work, feeling, as I do, its fullness of truth:

:

"If there were a reading public numerous, discerning, and impartial, the science of ethics, and all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, would advance with unexampled rapidity.

By the hope of obtaining the approbation which it would bestow upon genuine

merit, writers would be incited to the patient research and reflection which are not less requisite to the improvement of ethical than to the advancement of mathematical science.

"Slight and incoherent thinking would be received with general contempt, though it were cased in polished periods, studded with brilliant metaphors. Ethics would be considered by readers, and therefore treated by writers, as the matter or subject of a science; as a subject for persevering and accurate investigation, and not as a theme for childish and babbling rhetoric.

"This general demand for truth, (though it were clothed in homely guise,) and this general contempt of falsehood and nonsense, (though they were decked with rhetorical graces,) would improve the method and the style of inquiries into ethics, and into the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics. The writers would attend to the suggestions of Hobbes and of Locke, and would imitate the method so successfully pursued by geometers; though such is the variety of the premises which some of their

inquiries involve, and such are the complexity and ambiguity of some of the terms, that they would often fall short of the perfect exactness and coherency which the fewness of his premises, and the simplicity and definiteness of his expressions, enable the geometer to reach. But though they would often fall short of geometrical exactness and coherency, they might always approach, and would often attain, to them: they would acquire the art and the habit of defining their leading terms; of steadily adhering to the meanings announced by the definitions; of carefully examining, and distinctly stating, their premises; and of deducing the consequences of their premises with logical rigour. Without rejecting embellishments which might happen to fall in their way, the only excellencies of style for which they would seek are precision, clearness, and conciseness; the first being absolutely requisite to the successful prosecution of inquiry, whilst the others enable the reader to seize the meaning with certainty, and spare him unnecessary fatigue.