Rite sequi, et magnam gemina cum prole Parentem? Tum diræ audiri voces, tum infanda videri Mox tenebras inter medias lux alma repente Excipit, et dulces nemorum in convallibus umbræ. Semen alunt sulci, turgetque in palmite germen. Ergo, si qua fides, ubi sancto in limine membra Foedera, qui pulchram hanc florentemque ubere terram, Imperiis regit omnipotens, impletque, movetque, G. HOWARD, EX ÆDE CHRISTI, 138 ON THE ATTRIBUTES THAT CONSTITUTE THE PERFECTION OF BEING. UNLESS we can agree in attaching a clear, uniform, and definite idea to the term perfection, we can have no certainty of understanding each other, when we use it either in conversation or writing. Whatever a person affirms of it, may indeed be true, in the sense which he annexes to it; but if others understand it in a different sense, they either differ with him in opinion, or run the risk of being misled by assenting to what he asserts of it; for though it may be true in the one sense, it may be erroneous in the other. It is a term applied by some writers to the works of man; while others, who pretend to examine more rigidly the idea for which it stands, maintain that there is nothing perfect but God-that he alone is absolute perfection, because he alone is the only being to whom nothing is wanting. This is the language of philosophers and metaphysicians; but I doubt whether it has not more the appearance than the reality of truth, and whether it be not as applicable to the works of the Creator as to the Creator himself; and even to the works of man, whenever they are found to contain all the qualities or modes of being that enter into our ideas of perfection. I know it will be easily granted me, that every thing is perfect which possesses these qualities; while it will still be contended that the Deity alone is the only being to whom they can belong, and that a perfect poem, painting, or statue, never proceeded from the hand of man, nor yet any other production to which the term can be applied. To appreciate more correctly the value of this doctrine, let us first examine in what perfection is supposed to consist; secondly, whether this supposed perfection can exist; and thirdly, in what perfection ought to consist: and if we find that perfection cannot consist in what it is supposed to consist, let us agree in making it consist in what it ought to consist. Perfection, then, we are told, consists in that which wants nothing; and a perfect being is a being that contains in himself every thing necessary to render him perfect, who would be perfect if there were no other being in existence but himself, and whose attributes, powers, energies, capacities, omniscience, omnipresence, ubiquity, mercy, benevo lence, happiness, and general affections, are all contained in himself, and would belong to him if he stood alone in the creation. Now if perfection consists in that which wants nothing, there is not such a thing as perfection in existence; and if a perfect being be he who contains in himself, independent of all other beings, every thing which can be desired-who would be equally happy had there been no other being in existence, and who consequently owes all his happiness to himself-who could exert all his attributes, and exercise all his powers, if he stood alone in the creationI have no hesitation to say that the Creator is not such a being, and that it is not possible for the mind of man to conceive the existence of such a being. If this can be shown, it is idle and absurd to make perfection consist in that in which it cannot consist; and if, after putting off the incumbrance of mortality, we should discover that the perfection of the Deity is independent of all other beings, yet, as it is impossible for us to conceive the nature of this perfection, it is obvious that it is not the perfection of which we treat at present, because we must mean by perfection something that we understand, or otherwise we mean nothing. All our ideas of perfection, then, are mere ideas of relation; and if so, absolute inherent perfection can have no existence, and the term, applied to God himself, will be found to have only a relative meaning. We have no idea of perfection but what consists in qualities, properties, attributes, or powers; nor have we any idea of a perfect being, abstracted from the possession of attributes or powers. So far, however, as we can conceive the subject, it is not the being that confers perfection on the attributes, but the attributes that confer it on the being; so that, in all cases, perfection can belong to attributes alone. Render a tyrant charitable and benevolent, and he is no longer a tyrant, but a charitable and benevolent man. So far then as he becomes more perfect than he was before, this perfection is produced by the attributes of charity and benevolence: they communicate their virtues to him, but he has nothing to communicate in return, as he cannot change the nature of the things by which he is changed. If it should be said that his acquiring the attributes of charity and benevolence depended intirely on himself-that he might have rejected them if he chose, and not suffered himself to yield to their influence-and that, consequently, the merit of becoming more perfect is intirely his own; I reply, that the very power which he exercises in repelling the blandishments of vice and embracing the asperities of virtue, is not only one of his attributes, but that one which enables him to approach nearest to perfection. We can, therefore, form no idea of perfection, but what consists in attributes; and therefore, when we pronounce any thing perfect, we can only mean that it is in possession of attributes which render it perfect. But though perfection can belong only to attributes, yet our ideas of perfection are not acquired from the relation that exists between certain attributes and the being to which they belong, or the subject in which they inhere, but from the relation that exists between them and subjects to which they do not belong. This may appear paradoxical, but it is not the less evident. Attributes or qualities are only the powers of acting, or of yielding to action, which belong to any being. But power can be exercised by no being, not even by God himself, without a subject on which it may be exercised; nor can it even exist, suppose it to remain unemployed, without the existence of this subject. When I say that a subject which may be acted on, is as necessary to the existence of power, as the subject to which the power belongs-I mean that it is as necessary to every mode of power of which man can form any idea; and it would be absurd to suppose the existence of a power of which he can form no idea; because this would not be power, but something else, as power only means that attribute of being which the term conveys to our minds. We can form no idea of power or effect, unless there be something in which the effect may be produced. To say that an effect might be produced in nothing, is to say something to which we attach no idea; because we cannot form an idea of an effect existing by itself, or produced in nothing; as the very term, effect, implies a change produced in something. All the powers, energies, faculties, attributes, qualities, affections, properties, &c. which belong to any being, depend, therefore, as much for their existence on other beings, as on the being in which they are found; as they could never be exercised, and consequently could not exist, if these other beings did not exist at the same time. Man enjoys the power of doing good or evil; but does not the existence of this power depend as much on the existence of good and evil, as on him? If good and evil did not exist, he could no longer enjoy free-will. So of all his other powers and |