De Falsa Legat. p. 390. 1. 12. εἰ δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἤρεσκε ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν, αὐτίκα εἴσεσθε, (quibus enim placuerint, ii schini aderunt, patrocinabuntur,) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν πω λέγω περὶ οὐδενὸς, οὐδ ̓ αἰτιῶμαι, οὐδ ̓ ἀναγκασθέντ ̓ αὐτῶν οὐδένα δεῖ δοκεῖν χρηστὸν εἶναι τήμερον, ἀλλὰ δι ̓ αὑτὸν, καὶ τὸ μὴ κεκοινωνηκέναι τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

Sensus est:-Neminem hodie præterquam Æschinem accuso. nemo igitur coactus, nolens volens, innocentiam suam demonstrabit ; sed ultro, sponte sua, Æschinem non defendendo : non defendet enim nisi facinorum particeps.-cæcutit hic Reiskius.

De Falsa Legat. p. 390. 1. 24. ἀλλὰ τρεῖς μῆνας ὅλους ἀποδημήσαντες, καὶ χιλίας δραχμὰς λαβόντες ἐφόδιον παρ' ὑμῶν ὅσα παρ' οὐ δεμιᾶς ἄλλης πόλεως, οὔθ ̓ ὅτε ἐκεῖσε ἐπορεύοντο, οὔθ ̓ ὅτ ̓ ἐκεῖθεν δεῦρο τοὺς ὅρκους ἔλαβον, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ διοσκουρείου.

Nec inter eundum, nec inter redeundum, jusjurandum a Philippo et sociis, in propriis a quoque finibus, ut par erat, exegerunt.

De Falsa Legat. p. 394. 1. 27. τί δήποτε, ὡς φής, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ἀπὸ τοῦ συνειπεῖν ἐμὲ (Eschinem) Φιλοκράτει, γνοὺς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἡμᾶς πράττοντας, τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα πρεσβείαν τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους συνε πρέσβευσας πάλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξωμόσω;

ἀπὸ τοῦ συνειπεῖν ἐμὲ Φιλοκράτει) Inter primam scilicet et se cundam legationem.

De Falsa Legat. p. 395. 1. 1. ταῦτα μέμνησθε, ὅτι τούτοις ώμο λογήκειν ἥξειν, οὓς ἐλυσάμην, καὶ κομιεῖν τὰ λύτρα καὶ σώσειν εἰς δύναμιν.

Legatione prima promissum dederat Demosthenes, quod

secunda absolvit.

De Falsa Legat. p. 410. 1. 2. σκοπεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, εἰ ἐφ ̓ οἷς ὁ μηδοτιοῦν ἀδικῶν ἐφοβούμην ἐγώ, μὴ διὰ τούτους ἀπόλωμαι, τὶ τούτους προσήκει παθεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἠδικηκότας ;

Eliminandum τὸ EI.Constructio; σκοπεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαστ ταὶ, τὶ προσήκει τούτους, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἠδικηκότας, παθεῖν (διὰ τὰ πεπραγμένα) ἐφ ̓ οἷς ἐγώ, ὁ μηδοτιοῦν ἀδικῶν, ἐφοβούμην μὴ διὰ τούτους ἀπόλωμαι.

De Falsa Legat. p. 411. 1. 2. καὶ δέδοικα, δέδοικα· (εἰρήσεται γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, ἅπανθ', ἃ φρονῶ, πρὸς ὑμᾶς) μὴ τότε μὲν τούτοις συνεπισπάσησθέ με τον μηδοτιοῦν ἀδικοῦντα, νῦν δ ̓ ἀναπεπτω · κότες ἦτε.

μὴ τότε] Sensus videtur poscere μή ποτε.” IURIN.

Legendum potius videtur, τότε μὲν μὴ τούτοις συνεπισπάσησθέ με τὸν μ. κ. νῦν δὲ μὴ ἀναπεπτωκότες ήτε. Sic τότε non ex συνεπιστ πάσησθε aptum erit, sed ex δέδοικα. “ Sape (σημείωσαι, non semper et præt. δέδοικα sive δέδια-præsentis signif. obtinet." inquit H. Steph. Thesaur. 1. 919. d.

De Falsa Legat. p. 413. 1. 26. τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔκρινεν Αἰσ χίνης, ὅτι τὸν αὐτοῦ παῖδα ἐπ ̓ αἰσχύνῃ πρὸς Φίλιππον ἔπεμψεν. ἐπ ̓ αἰσχύνῃ] Idem quod ἐφ ̓ ὕβρει. p 440. 1. 7.

De Falsa Legat. p. 415. 1. 13. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς ἐτιμᾶσθε ἠδίκηκέ τις ὑμῶν, καὶ ταῦτα τοιαῦτα, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ἂν μισοῖσθε δικαίως ἢ σώζοισθε ;

“F. Xai TaŬTA TÀ Tоlauta, præsertim in talibus et tantis rebus." Markland.

Quod ad sententiam quidem recte: articulus autem in hunc locum admitti non potest. xai taữтa tolauta, And that so flagrantly too. καὶ ταῦτα τ. exaggerat. τοιαῦτα regitur ab ἠδίκηκε.

De Falsa Legat. p. 417. 1. 21. εἶτα τὸν εἰς τὰς ὄρνις εἰσιόντα, καὶ μετὰ Πιτταλάκου περιϊόντα, καὶ τοιαῦτ ̓ εἰπῶν, ἀγνοεῖτ ̓, ἔφη, ποῖόν τινα ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ;

“Demosth. eis Tous ögvis lov, ad avium pugnas spectandas, ut gallinaceorum et coturnicum." H. Steph. Thes. 11. 1454.d. "In forum pullarium, aviarium." Reisk. in Indice Græc. Demosth.

THE MEEKNESS OF MOSES CONSIDERED. NUMBERS XII. 3.

THE very judicious and satisfactory observations of the late learned Dr. Kennicott, on the above subject and text, claim a more general acquaintance; and with this view their insertion is requested in the Classical Journal,-a publication so successfully devoted to the interests of "Classical, Biblical, and Oriental Literature." They only need to be understood, in order to be universally approved and adopted.

,ואיש משה ענו .3 .Num. XII

"This verse strikes almost every reader with surprise; partly on its own account, partly from its connexion. That Moses was meek above all men, if true, was not at all likely to have been recorded by himself. It is still less likely to have been said by one who has recorded himself as a man of great warmth. See Exod. ii, 11–14. v, 25. xi, 8. xxxii, 19, 22. Num. i, 13, 15, 16. And as to Num. xx, 10-12. see Ps. cvi. 32, 33. But if Moses had been in fact the meekest of men, the record of such a quality seems to have no connexion with the context here. The preceding verses set forth, that Miriam and Aaron exalted themselves as

rivals to Moses; boasting, that God had spoken by them likewise. And in the verses following, God declares, that he revealed himself to Moses more than to any other prophet. It therefore seems necessary to consider this 3d verse, as connected with the divine communications, and to translate the words thus:-Now the man Moses gave forth more answers, (from God) or was highly favored with answers, above all, &c.-erat responsor eximius (TND) præ omni homine, &c. Such is the excellent version of this place, in a thesis under the very learned Albert Schultens, in 1725. This author refers to Juchasin, where Ezra is called y responsor similis Mosi. And it is very remarkable, that 16 Mss. read y here, agreeably to the word in Juchasin. Spinoza (cap. viii. p. 107.) quotes this verse (Num. xii, 3.) as one proof, that Moses did not write the Pentateuch." See Boothroyd's Bibl. Hebr. 1. p. 142. Notes; who says in addition :-"The connexion evidently supports this rendering."

In examining the merits of the English version of the present text (and I am sorry to observe that all the other translations give the same meaning), an intelligent reader would be naturally desirous of knowing-what may be the literal idea of the original expression? what signification is required by the context and what appears to be the general testimony of inspired history relative to the moral disposition of Moses?

The primary meaning of y, as given by Lexicographers, is, to act upon, to answer, to own the last of which may perhaps have no distant etymological relation to the sacred tongue. And the passage therefore in question might not improperly be read-" Now the man Moses was owned above, &c.:"-a declaration not inconsistent with self-biography-well confirmed by every portion of the preceding history—and again established by the awful occurrences of the subsequent narrative.

This last idea seems decisively confirmatory of the literal interpretation, and shows what meaning is demanded by the general connexion. Miriam and Aaron, who had dared to question Moses' authority, were now convinced by painful experience, that he was indeed " owned," or "answered greatly more than any man who was on the face of that land ;" and that" the Lord hath indeed spoken only by Moses."

But while the lawgiver of Israel sustains this eminent distinction, what appears to be the purport of the sacred narrative respecting his temper? was he distinguished by meekness?" I trow not. The general contents of his biography would most certainly induce any other conclusion.

Finally, it must be observed, that these remarks are suggested with the view of noticing the real character, and worth of Moses; and in harmony with the volume of Inspiration, which enjoins us to "render to all their due," while it cautions us against "adding to," as well as "taking from," any part of its testiJ. W.

mony.

Oswestry, 1823.

ON THE ATTRIBUTES THAT CONSTITUTE THE PERFECTION OF BEING.

No. II. [Continued from No. LIII. p. 145.] PERFECTION, then, does not consist, either in the possession of extraordinary faculties or powers, nor yet in possessing faculties or powers, which are incapable of being improved, and to which, consequently, there is nothing wanting, because such powers can have no existence. And even if they could, what can be more repugnant to our ideas of perfection than a being who lived independent of all other beings, who communed with none of them, who possessed in himself every thing he wanted, and withdrew from all commerce with the creation around him? Such a being, so far from being perfect, would be the most imperfect, because the most useless being in the creation.

But it will be replied, that a being possessed of extraordinary faculties must be more perfect than one dissimilarly constituted; that power is more perfect than weakness, strength than debility, celerity than slowness, wisdom than ignorance, humility than pride, and forbearance than resentment: that a strong man is consequently more perfect than a weak man; a wise than an ignorant man, and so of all other qualities that are attributes of perfection. To this I reply, that the perfection of any being is not determined by the powers or faculties which he possesses, but by the adaptation of these faculties to the nature of his being, the situations and circumstances in which this nature is apt to place him, and the general relation which he holds with the beings that surround him. It is impossible for human imagination to conceive any endowment or faculty, either physical or intellectual, of which man is at present destitute, that would VOL. XXVII. CI. JI. NO. LIV. Q

render him more perfect than he is, were it conferred upon him. Neither would he be more perfect if any one faculty, which is now natural to him, were more exquisitely contrived, or encreased in the activity of its operations; because his perfection consists in the harmony or adaptation of all his faculties to each other, not in the excellence of any faculty in itself. If this harmony was not observed in our formation, we should then, indeed, be creatures intended for no certain end; for the moment our natural faculties break loose, and rebel against each other, we ourselves cannot, much less can others, tell the goal for which we are bound, because a being governed by contrary impulses, each of them forcing him into that course to which itself inclines, is like a pilot without a helm, exposed to the mercy of the winds and waves, and consequently unable to determine his course, as it is liable to change at every blast. Such a pilot in the midst of the great ocean can form no opinion of the port where he may ultimately arrive. The moral sense is the pilot of human nature, and accordingly we find, that whenever the natural passions and appetites of any individual disavow its sovereignty, and refuse to be guided by its directions, the moment the harmony that should exist between them is destroyed, there is an end to all consistency of action, and consequently to all uniformity of pursuit. Such a man can never depend upon himself, because he cannot tell how he may act the next moment, as the helm is lost which alone could direct him. There is only one case in which the slave of passion can tell what course he is certain of steering, namely, when one rebellious passion or appetite, predominates over all the rest, and hurries him forward in its own lawless but uniform career.

To render any faculty of man, therefore, more excellent than nature has rendered it, would be only to make him more imperfect by this superadded excellence, because a faculty exquisitely formed will not harmonise with faculties of a grosser mould. Let us suppose, for instance, that his intellect was so improved, that he could penetrate into the most secret recesses of the heart, would this be a step to perfection? It would, no doubt, if knowledge were preferable to happiness; for there would be an end to happiness the moment this knowledge was attained; as no one could endure to have his weaknesses, much less his vices, exposed to public view. Men, consequently, would avoid each other's society, and their superior discernment, or improved