the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature.

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made; still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which had before given, that for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as adinissable in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size froin what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other HI. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainorder, than that in which they are placed, either no ty into the argument, if there were a few parts of motion at all would have been carried on in the the watch, concerning which we could not dismachine, or none which would have answered the cover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner use that is now served by it. To reckon up a they conduced to the general effect, or even some few of the plainest of these parts, and of their of parts, concerning which we could not ascertain, fices, all tending to one result:-We see a cylin- whether they conduced to that effect in any mandrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, ner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the case; if by the loss, or disorder, or decay, of the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artifi- parts in question, the movement of the watch cially wrought for the sake of flexure,) communi- were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or cating the action of the spring from the box to the retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the to the utility or intention of these parts, although teeth of which catch in, and apply to each other, we should be unable to investigate the manner conducting the motion from the fusee to the according to which, or the connexion by which, balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and the ultimate effect depended upon their action or at the same time, by the size and shape of those assistance; and the more complex is the machine, wheels so regulating that motion, as to terminate the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, in causing an index, by an equable and measured as to the second thing supposed, namely, that progression, to pass over a given space in a given there were parts which might be spared, without time. We take notice that the wheels are made prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that of brass in order to keep them from rust; the we had proved this by experiment,-these supersprings of steel, no other metal being so elastic; fluous parts, even if we were completely assured that over the face of the watch there is placed a that they were such, would not vacate the reasonglass, a material employed in no other part of the ing which we had instituted concerning other work, but in the room of which, if there had been parts. The indication of contrivance remained, any other than a transparent substance, the hour with respect to them, nearly as it was before. could not be seen without opening the case. This IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood,) the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actual-well as a different structure. ly to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time, and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all

senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, riz. of the works of a watch, as

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode,

according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or indeed as "the law of nature," in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knows nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end; he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

CHAPTER II.

State of the Argument continued.

either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn; but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair, is neither more nor less than this; by the application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it, and arranged by intelligence, an effect is produced, viz. the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary, for any share which the water has in grinding the corn; yet is this share the same as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Therefore,

III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch which our observer had found, was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now than they were before. In the SUPPOSE, in the next place, that the person who same thing, we may ask for the cause of different found the watch, should, after some time, discover properties. We may ask for the cause of the cothat, in addition to all the properties which he had lour of a body, of its hardness, of its heat; and hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected these causes may be all different. We are now property of producing, in the course of its move- asking for the cause of that subserviency to a use, ment, another watch like itself (the thing is con- that relation to an end, which we have remarked ceivable); that it contained within it a mechanism, in the watch before us. No answer is given to a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a com- this question, by telling us that a preceding watch plex adjustment of lathes, files, and other tools, produced it. There cannot be design without a evidently and separately calculated for this pur-designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order, pose; let us inquire, what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion.

without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation I. The first effect would be to increase his ad- to a purpose, without that which could intend a miration of the contrivance, and his conviction of purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether their office in accomplishing that end, without the he regarded the object of the contrivance, the dis-end ever having been contemplated, or the meaus tinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism, by which it was carried on he would perceive, in this new observation, nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done,—for referring the construction of the watch to design, and to supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it; still more strong would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this farther property, the crown and perfection

of all the rest.

II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, in some sense, the maker of the watch which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second: in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order,

accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it ;—could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before.

IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty farther back, i. e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back, ever so far, brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither

supplied by this supposition, nor dispensed with. | our thoughts, is, whence this contrivance and de

sign? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number or succession of substances, destitute of these properties; nor the more, by increasing that number to infini ty. If it be said, that upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other's movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, viz. the watch from which it proceeded: I deny, that for the design, the contn

adaptation of instruments to a use (all which we discover in the watch,) we have any cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such causes, or to allege that a series may be car ried back to infinity; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all of the phenomena, still less any series of causes, either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver; proofs of design, but no designer.

If the difficulty were diminished the farther we went back, by going back indefinitely, we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, there, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained: but where there is no such tendency, or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question (whatever there may be as to many points,) between one series and another; bevance, the suitableness of means to an end, the tween a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain composed of an infinite number of links, can no more support itself, than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured (though we never can have tried the experiment), because, by increasing the number of links, from ten for instance to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, &c. we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency towards self-support, V. Our observer would farther also reflect, There is no difference in this respect (yet there that the maker of the watch before him, was, in may be a great difference in several respects) be- truth and reality, the maker of every watch protween a chain of a greater or less length, between duced from it; there being no difference except one chain and another, between one that is finite that the latter manifests a more exquisite skill be and one that is infinite. This very much resem-tween the making of another watch with his own bles the case before us. The machine which we hands, by the mediation of files, lathes, chisels, are inspecting demonstrates, by its construction, &c. and the disposing, fixing, and inserting, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have these instruments, or of others equivalent to them, had a contriver; design a designer; whether the in the body of the watch already made, in such a machine immediately proceeded from another ma- manner as to form a new watch in the course of chine or not. That circumstance alters not the the movements which he had given to the old case. That other machine may, in like manner, one. It is only working by one set of tools instead have proceeded from a former machine: nor does of another. that alter the case; contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from one preceding it: no alteration still; a contriver is still necessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every succession of these machines; a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one series, as with another; a series which is finite, as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other respects they may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and design are unaccounted for.

The conclusion which the first examination of, the watch, of its works, construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A se cond examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the course of its movement, to produce another watch, similar to itself; and not only so, but we perceive in it a system or organization, separately calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery have, The question is not simply, How came the first or ought it to have, upon our former inference? watch into existence? which question, it may be What, as hath already been said, but to increase, pretended, is done away by supposing the series beyond measure, our admiration of the skill which of watches thus produced from one another to had been employed in the formation of such a mahave been infinite, and consequently to have had chine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once no such first, for which it was necessary to pro- turn us round to an opposite conclusion, viz. that vide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the nearly the state of the question, if nothing had business, although all other evidences of art and been before us but an unorganized, unmechanized skill remain as they were, and this last and susubstance, without mark or indication of contri-preme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can vance. It might be difficult to show that such this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is substance could not have existed from eternity, atheism.

either in succession (if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring from one another,) or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether he had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place; for, in the watch which we are examining, are seen contrivance, design; an end, a purpose; means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question which irresistibly presses upon

CHAPTER III.
Application of the Argument.

THIS is atheism: for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which exist ed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which ex

ceeds all computation. I mean, that the contri- | fore us, it is a matter of certainty, because it is a vances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, matter which experience and observation demonin the complexity, subtilty, and curiosity, of the strate, that the formation of an image at the botmechanism; and still more, if possible, do they tom of the eye is necessary to perfect vision. The go beyond them in number and variety; yet, in image itself can be shown. Whatever affects the a multitude of cases, are not less evidently me- distinctness of the image, affects the distinctness chanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less of the vision. The formation then of such an evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to image being necessary (no matter how) to the their office, than are the most perfect productions sense of sight, and to the exercise of that sense, of human ingenuity. the apparatus by which it is formed is constructed I know no better method of introducing so large and put together, not only with infinitely more a subject, than that of comparing a single thing art, but upon the self-same principles of art, as in with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a the telescope or the camera obscura. The pertelescope. As far as the examination of the in- ception arising from the image may be laid out of strument goes, there is precisely the same proof the question; for the production of the image, that the eye was made for vision, as there is that these are instruments of the same kind. The end the telescope was made for assisting it. They are is the same; the means are the same. The purmade upon the same principles; both being ad- pose in both is alike; the contrivance for accomjusted to the laws by which the transmission and plishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses refraction of rays of light are regulated. I speak of the telescope, and the humours of the eye, bear not of the origin of the laws themselves; but such a complete resemblance to one another, in their laws being fixed, the construction, in both cases, figure, their position, and in their power over the is adapted to them. For instance; these laws re- rays of light, viz. in bringing each pencil to a quire, in order to produce the same effect, that the point at the right distance from the lens; namely, rays of light, in passing from water into the eye, in the eye, at the exact place where the memshould be refracted by a more convex surface, brane is spread to receive it. How is it possible, unthan when it passes out of air into the eye. Ac-der circumstances of such close affinity, and under cordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this difference? What could a mathematical instrument-maker have done more, to show his knowledge of his principle, his application of that knowledge, his suiting of his means to his end; I will not say to display the compass or excellence of his skill and art, for in these all comparison is indecorous, but to testify counsel, choice, consideration, purpose?

the operation of equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the one, yet to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the other?

The resemblance between the two cases is still more accurate, and obtains in more points than we have yet represented, or than we are, on the first view of the subject, aware of. In dioptric telescopes, there is an imperfection of this nature. Pencils of light, in passing through glass lenses, are separated into different colours, thereby tinging the object, especially the edges of it, as if it To some it may appear a difference sufficient were viewed through a prism. To correct this to destroy all similitude between the eye and the inconvenience had been long a desideratum in telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the the art. At last it came into the mind of a sagaother an unperceiving instrument. The fact is, cious optician, to inquire how this matter was that they are both instruments. And, as to the managed in the eye; in which there was exactly mechanism, at least as to mechanism being em- the same difficulty to contend with as in the teleployed, and even as to the kind of it, this circum- scope. His observation taught him, that, in the stance varies not the analogy at all. For, observe eye, the evil was cured by combining lenses comwhat the constitution of the eye is. It is neces-posed of different substances, i. e. of substances sary, in order to produce distinct vision, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bottom of the eye. Whence this necessity arises, or how the picture is connected with the sensation, or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay, we will confess, if you please, impossible for us to search out. But the present question is not concerned in the inquiry. It may be true, that, in this, and in other instances, we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way: and that then we come to something which is not mechanical, or which is inscrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our investigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic statue, consists in this, that, in the animal, we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped; either the mechanism becoming too subtile for our discernment, or something else beside the known laws of mechanism taking place; whereas, in the automaton, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout. But up to the limit, the reasoning is as clear and certain in the one case as in the other. In the example be

which possessed different refracting powers. Our artist borrowed thence his hint; and produced a correction of the defect, by imitating, in glasses made from different materials, the effects of the different humours through which the rays of light pass before they reach the bottom of the eye. Could this be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose?

But farther; there are other points, not so much perhaps of strict resemblance between the two, as of superiority of the eye over the telescope; yet of a superiority which, being founded in the laws that regulate both, may furnish topics of fair and just comparison. Two things were wanted to the eye, which were not wanted (at least in the same degree) to the telescope; and these were, the adaptation of the organ, first, to different degrees of light; and, secondly, to the vast diversity of distance at which objects are viewed by the naked eye, viz. from a few inches to as many miles. These difficulties present not themselves to the maker of the telescope. He wants all the light he can get; and he never directs his instrument to

objects near at hand. In the eye, both these purpose, is so minute as to elude ordinary observacases were to be provided for; and for the purpose tion. Some very late discoveries, deduced from a of providing for them, a subtile and appropriate mechanism is introduced:

I. In order to exclude excess of light, when it is excessive, and to render objects visible under obscurer degrees of it, when no more can be had, the hole or aperture in the eye, through which the light enters, is so formed, as to contract or dilate itself for the purpose of admitting a greater or less number of rays at the same time. The chamber of the eye is a camera obscura, which, when the light is too small, can enlarge its opening; when too strong, can again contract it; and that without any other assistance than that of its own exquisite machinery. It is farther also, in the human subject, to be observed, that this hole in the eye which we call the pupil, under all its different dimensions, retains its exact circular shape. This is a structure extremely artificial. Let an artist only try to execute the same; he will find that his threads and strings must be disposed with great consideration and contrivance, to make a circle, which shall continually change its diameter, yet preserve its form. This is done in the eye by an application of fibres, i. e. of strings, similar, in their position and action, to what an artist would and must employ, if he had the same picce of workmanship to perform.

laborious and most accurate inspection of the structure and operation of the organ, seem at length to have ascertained the mechanical alteration which the parts of the eye undergo. It is found, that by the action of certain muscles, called the straight muscles, and which action is the most advantageous that could be imagined for the purpose, it is found, I say, that whenever the eye is directed to a near object, three changes are produced in it at the same time, all severally contributing to the adjustment required. The cornea, or outermost coat of the eye, is rendered more round and prominent; the crystalline lens underneath is pushed forward; and the axis of vision, as the depth of the eye is called, is elongated. These changes in the eye vary its power over the rays of light in such a manner and degree as to produce exactly the effect which is wanted, viz. the formation of an image upon the retina, whether the rays come to the eye in a state of divergency, which is the case when the object is near to the eye, or come parallel to one another, which is the case when the object is placed at a distance. Can any thing be more decisive of contrivance than this is? The most secret laws of optics must have been known to the author of a structure endowed with such a capacity of change. It is as though an optician, when he had a nearer object to view, should rectify his instrument by putting in another glass, at the same time drawing out also his tube to a different length.

II. The second difficulty which has been stated, was the suiting of the same organ to the perception of objects that lie near at hand, within a few inches, we will suppose, of the eye, and of objects which are placed at a considerable distance from Observe a new-born child first lifting up its eye it, that, for example, of as many furlongs (I speak lids. What does the opening of the curtain disin both cases of the distance at which distinct cover? The anterior part of two pellucid globes, vision can be exercised.) Now this, according to which, when they come to be examined, are found the principles of optics, that is, according to the to be constructed upon strict optical principles; laws by which the transmission of light is regu- the self-same principles upon which we ourselves lated (and these laws are fixed,) could not be done construct optical instruments. We find them perwithout the organ itself undergoing an alteration, fect for the purpose of forming an image by retracand receiving an adjustment, that might correspond tion; composed of parts executing different offices: with the exigency of the case, that is to say, with one part having fulfilled its office upon the pencil the different inclination to one another under of light, delivering it over to the action of another which the rays of light reached it. Rays issuing part; that to a third, and so onward; the progressfrom points placed at a small distance from the ive action depending for its success upon the nicest eye, and which consequently must enter the eye and minutest adjustment of the parts concerned; in a spreading or diverging order, cannot, by the yet these parts so in fact adjusted, as to produce, optical instrument in the same state, be brought not by a simple action or effect, but by a combinato a point, i. e. be made to form an image, in the tion of actions and effects, the result which is ul same place with rays proceeding from objects situ-timately wanted. And forasmuch as this organ ated at a much greater distance, and which rays arrive at the eye in directions nearly (and physically speaking) parallel. It requires a rounder lens to do it. The point of concourse behind the lens must fall critically upon the retina, or the vision is confused; yet, other things remaining the same, this point, by the immutable properties of light, is carried farther back when the rays proceed from a near object, than when they are sent from one that is remote. A person who was using an optical instrument, would manage this matter by changing, as the occasion required, his lens or his telescope; or by adjusting the distance of his glasses with his hand or his screw: but how is it to be managed in the eye? What the alteration was, or in what part of the eye it took place, or by what means it was effected (for if the known laws which govern the refraction of light be maintained, some alteration in the state of the organ there must be,) had long formed a subject of inquiry and conjecture. The change, though sufficient for the

would have to operate under different circumstances, with strong degrees of light, and with weak degrees, upon near objects, and upon remote ones; and these differences demanded, according to the laws by which the transmission of light is regulated, a corresponding diversity of structure; that the aperture, for example, through which the light passes, should be larger or less; the lenses rounder or flatter, or that their distance from the tablet, upon which the picture is delineated, should be shortened or lengthened: this, I say, being the case, and the difficulty to which the eye was to be adapted, we find its several parts capable of being occasionally changed, and a most artificial apparatus provided to produce that change. This is far beyond the common regulator of a watch, which requires the touch of a foreign hand to set it; but it is not altogether unlike Harrison's contrivance for making a watch regulate itself, by inserting within it a machinery, which, by the artful use of the different expansion of metals, preserves