of his way mince the business, and say the concurrence | ral powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful. 2. This I am to consider as an argument for God's predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. And thus it must be conceived: That if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, repentance, love to himself, prayer; therefore to the acts of enmity against himself, cursing, idolatry, blasphemy, &c. And is it not a mighty consequence? If to actions that are good quoad substantiam, therefore to such as are in the substance of them evil? We ourselves can, in a remoter kind, concur to the actions of others: because you may afford, yourself, your leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, therefore may you to them that are downright evil? because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing? and then ruin men for the actions you induced hem to You will say, God may rather, but sure he can much less do so than you. How could you be serious in the proposal of this question? real influence upon those powers. 6. That this influence is in reference to holy and spiritual actions (whereto since the apostacy the nature of man is become viciously disinclined) necessary to be effica ciously determinative; such as shall overcome that disinclination, and reduce those powers into act. 7. That the ordinary, appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence, is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his word, viz. the precepts, promises, and comminations, which are the moral instruments of his government. No doubt but he may (as is intimated in the letter) extraordinarily act men in some rarer cases, by inward impulse, without the help of such external means, as he did prophets or inspired persons; and when he hath done so, we were not to think he treated them unagreeably to their natures, or so as their natures could not, without violence, admit. But it hath been the care and designment of the We are at a loss how it should consist with the Divine Divine wisdom, so to order the way of dispensation towisdom, justice, goodness, and truth, to design the punish- wards the several sorts of creatures, as not only not, ording man, yet innocent, with everlasting torments, for ac- narily, to impose upon them what they could not convetions which God, himself, would irresistibly move him to; niently be patient of, but so as that their powers and whereas his making a covenant with Adam in reference faculties might be put upon the exercises whereof they to himself and his posterity, implied there was a possibility were capable, and to provide that neither their passive it might be kept; at least that he would not make the capacity should be overcharged, nor their active be unemkeeping of it, by his own positive influence, impossible.ployed. And whereas the reasonable nature of man renders And you say, if he might concur to the substrate matter him not only susceptible of unexpected internal impresof an action as good, (which tends to man's salvation and sions, but also capable of being governed by laws, which blessedness,) he must necessarily concur (and that by an requires the use of his own endeavour to understand and irresistible determinative influence, else you say nothing obey them; and whereas we also find such laws are actuto me) to the substrate matter of all their evil actions, as ally made for him, and propounded to him with their proevil, which tend to their ruin and misery, brought upon | per enforcements. If it should be the fixed course of God's them by the actions which God makes them do. I sup- government over him, only to guide him by inward impose St. Luke vi. 9. with Hos. xiii. 9. show a difference. If pulses; this (as is said in that letter) would render those you therefore ask me, why I should not admit this conse- laws and their sanctions impertinencies, his faculties quence? I say it needs no other answer, than that I take whereby he is capable of moral government so far, and wisdom, righteousness, goodness, and truth, to belong to this purpose, useless and vain: and would be an occamore to the idea of God, than their contraries. sion, which the depraved nature of man would be very apt to abuse into a temptation to them, never to bind their powers to the endeavour of doing any thing that were of a holy and spiritual tendency, (from which their aversion would be always prompting them to devise excuses,) more than a mere machine would apply itself to the uses which it was made for and doth not understand. Q. 2. Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof? A. True. And what shall be inferred? That therefore God must by a determinative influence produce every such action whatsoever reason there be against it? You might better argue thence the necessity of his producing, every hour, a new world; in which there would be a great deal more of positive entity, and natural goodness. Cer-pect God should only surprise them, while they resolvedly tainly the natural goodness that is in the entity of an action, is no such invitation to the holy God by determinative influence to produce it, as that he should offer violence to his own nature, and stain the justice and honour of his government, by making it be done, and then punish it being done. Q. 3. Do we not cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing the lower world, &c. ? Therefore, lest any should be so unreasonable, as to exsit still and sleep; he hath, in his infinite wisdom, withheld from them the occasion hereof; and left them destitute of any encouragement (whatsoever his extraordinary dealings may have been with some) to expect his influ ences, in the neglect of his ordinary methods, as is discoursed p. 121. and at large in the following pages. And which is the plain sense of that admonition, Phil. ii. 12, 13. Yea, and though there be never so many instances of A. What? by denying that 'tis the stated way of God's merciful surprisals, preventive of all our own consideragovernment, to urge men, irresistibly, to all that wicked- tion and care, yet those are still to be accounted the ordiness, for which he will afterwards punish them with ever-nary methods which are so de jure, which would actually lasting torments? I should least of all ever have expected be so, if men did their duty, and which God hath obliged such a question to this purpose, and am ashamed further us to observe and attend unto as such. to answer it. Only name any act of providence, I hereby 8. That in reference to all other actions which are no deny, if you can. In the next place, that my sense may sinful, though there be not a sinful disinclination to them, appear in my own words; and that I may show how far yet because there may be a sluggishness and ineptitude to I am of the same mind with those that apprehend me at some purposes God intends to serve by them, this influso vast a distance from them; and where, if they go fur-ence is also always determinative thereunto; whensoever ther, our parting point must be; I shall set down the par- to the immense wisdom of God shall seem meet, and conticulars of my agreement with them, and do it in no other ducing to his own great and holy ends. heads than they might have collected, if they had pleased, out of that letter. As, 1. That God exerciseth a universal providence about all his creatures, both in sustaining and governing them. 2. That, more particularly, he exerciseth such a provi dence about man. 3. That this providence about man extends to all the actions of all men. 4. That it consists not alone in beholding the actions of men, as if he were a mere spectator of them only, but is positively active about them. 5. That this active providence of God about all the actions of men consists not merely in giving them the natu 9. That, in reference to sinful actions, by this influence God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers, whereby they are done, but also, as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural designation; and whereto they are not sinfully disin clined. 10. That, if men do then employ them to the doing of any sinful action; by that same influence, he doth, as to him seems meet, limit, moderate, and, against the inclination and design of the sinful agent, overrule and dispose it to good. But now if, besides all this, they will also assert; that God doth, by an efficacious influence, move and determine men to wicked actions. This is that which I most resolvedly deny. That is, in this I shall differ with them, that I do not suppose God to have, by internal influence, as far a hand in the worst and wickedest actions, as in the best. I assert more to be necessary to actions to which men are wickedly disinclined; but that less will suffice for their doing of actions to which they have inclination more than enough. I reckon it sufficient to the production of this latter sort of actions, that their powers be actually habile, and apt for any such action, in the general, as is connatural to them; supposing there be not a peccant aversion, as there is to all those actions that are holy and spiritual; which aversion a more potent (even a determinative) influence is necessary to overcome. I explain myself by instance. as well as learned men have been of their opinion. And I seriously believe it. But that signifies nothing to the goodness of the opinion. Nor doth the badness of it extinguish my charity nor reverence towards the men. For I consider, that as many hold the most important truths, and which most directly tend to impress the image of God upon their souls, that yet are never stamped with any such impression thereby; so, it is not impossible some may have held very dangerous opinions, with a notional judgment, the pernicious influence whereof hath never distilled upon their hearts. Neither shall I be willing without necessity to detect other men's infirmities. Yet if I find myself any way obliged further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to spend in this world, can never be spent to better purpose, than in discovering the fearful consequences of that rejected opinion, the vanity of the subterA man hath from God the powers belonging to his na-fuges whereby its assertors think to hide the malignity of ture, by which he is capable of loving or hating an appre- it; and the inefficacy of the arguments brought for it. hended good or evil. These powers being, by a present Especially those two which the letter takes notice of. For Divine influence, rendered habile, and apt for action; he as so ill-coloured an opinion ought never to be admitted can now love a good name, health, ease, life, and hate dis- without the most apparent necessity, so do I think it most grace, sickness, pain, death: but he doth also by these apparent there is no necessity it should be admitted upon powers, thus habilitated for action, love wickedness, and those grounds or any other. And doubt not but that both hate God. I say, now, that to those former acts God the governing providence of God in reference to all events should over and besides determine him, is not absolutely whatsoever, and his most certain foreknowledge of them and always necessary; and to the latter, is impossible. all, may be defended, against all opposers, without it. But But that, to hate wickedness universally, and as such, and I had rather my preparations to these purposes should be to love God, the depravedness of his nature, by the apos- buried in dust and silence; than I should ever see the tacy, hath made the determinative influence of efficacious occasion which should carry the signification with it of grace necessary. Which, therefore, he hath indispensable their being at all needful. And I shall take it for a just obligation (nor is destitute of encouragement) earnestly to and most deplorable occasion, if I shall find any to assert implore and pray for. My meaning is now plain to such against me the contradictory to this proposition:-That doth not by an efficacious influence, universally move and determine men to all their actions; even those that are most wicked.-Which is the only true and plain meaning of what was said, about this ousiness, in the before-mentioned letter. as have a mind to understand it. Having thus given an account wherein I agree with :hem, and wherein, if they please, I must differ. It may perhaps be expected I should add further reasons of that 2:fference on my part. But I shall for the present forbear to do it. I know it may be alleged, that some very pious MAN'S CREATION IN A HOLY BUT MUTABLE STATE. ECCLES. VII. 29. LO, THIS ONLY HAVE I FOUND, THAT GOD HATH MADE MAN UPRIGHT; BUT THEY HAVE SOUGHT OUT MANY INVENTIONS. 2. That man's defection from his primitive state was purely voluntary, and from the unconstrained choice of his own mutable and self-determining will. In these words you have the result of a serious inquiry Doct. 1. That God endued the nature of man, in his into the state of mankind. In the verse immediately fore-creation, with a perfect and universal rectitude. going, the preacher speaks his own experience, touching each sex distributively; how rare it was to meet with a wise and good man, how much rarer with a prudent and virtuous woman; (so he must be understood, though these qualities are not expressed;) then in the text gives this verdict touching both collectively, tending to acquit their Maker of their universal depravation, and convict them. "Lo, this only have I found," &c. (Though the latter part of the text would afford a sufficient ground to treat of the state of man now fallen; yet that being by agreement left to another hand, I observe no more from it than what concerns the manner of his fall, and that only as it depended on a mutable will.) In handling these truths, I shall, 1. Open them in certain explicatory theses. 2. Improve them in some few practical and applicatory inferences. 1. About the former-that God endued, &c.-take these propositions for explication. Prop. 1. All created rectitude consists in conformity to some rule or law. Rectitude is a mere relative thing, and its relation is to a rule. By a rule, I here mean a law strictly taken; and therefore I speak this only of created rectitude. A law, is a rule of duty given by a superior to an inferior; nothing can be in that sense a rule to God, or the measure of increated rectitude. Prop. 2. The highest rule of all created rectitude, is an eternal and immutable reason, justice, and goodness. The words contain two propositions.-The first touching man's perfection by his creation, "God made," &c. The second touching his defection by sin, "But they have sought," &c. Together with a solemn preface introducing both, and recommending them as well-weighed truths, "Lo, this only have I found," &c. q. d. "I do not now speak at random, and by guess; no, but I solemnly pronounce it, as that which I have found out by serious study and diligent exploration, that God made man upright," &c. The terms are not obscure, and are fitly rendered. I find no considerable variety of readings, and cannot needlessly spend time about words. Only in short,-By man you must understand man collectively, so as to comprehend the whole species.—Making him upright, you must under-the will of God, considered as including most intrinsically stand so as to refer making not to the adjunct only, supposing the subject pre-existent, but to both subject and adjunct together; and so 'tis man's concreate and original righteousness that is here meant.-By inventions understand (as the antithesis doth direct) such as are alien from this rectitude. Nor is it altogether improbable that in this expression, some reference may be had to that curious desire of knowing much that tempted Adam and Eve into the first transgression.-Many inventions, seems to be spoken in opposition to that simplicity and singleness of hearting the reasonable creature's duty, is a law, indispensably which this original rectitude did include; truth is but one; falsehood, manifold. God made man upright, i. e. simple, plain-hearted, free from all tortuous windings, and involutions. (So the word rendered upright in the text doth signify; and Jeshurun derived therefrom, which God thought a fit name for his people Israel, the seed of plainhearted Jacob, to be known by; answerably whereto Nathanael is said to be a true Israelite, in whom was no guile.) Such man was at first; now, in the room of this simplicity, you find a multiplicity: he was of one constant, uniform frame and tenor of spirit, held one straight, direct, and even course; now he is become full of inventions, grown vafrous, multiform as to the frame of his spirit, uncertain, intricate, perplexed in all his ways.-Sought out, this notes the voluntariness, and perfect spontaneity of his defection; 'twas his own doing. God made him upright; he hath sought out means to deform and undo himself. The words thus opened afford us two great gospel truths. a John i. 47. Prop. 4. The law given to Adam at his creation was partly natural, given by way of internal impression upon his soul; partly positive, given (as is probable) by some more external discovery or revelation. That the main body of law, whereby man was to be governed, should be at first given no other way than by stamping them upon his mind and heart, was a thing congruous enough to his innocent state; (as it is to angels and saints in glory;) it being then exactly contempered to his nature, highly ap provable to his reason, (as is evident, in that being fallen, his reason ceases not to approve it, Rom. ii. 18.) fully suitable to the inclination and tendency of his will, and not at all regretted by any reluctant principle that might in the least oppose or render him doubtful about his duty. b Rom. vii. 12. xii. 1, 2. Ezek. xviii. 25. chap. xxxiii. Yet was it most reasonable also, that some positive commands should be superadded, that God's right of dominion and government over him as Creator, might be more expressly asserted, and he might more fully apprebend his own obligation as a creature to do some things, because it was his Maker's will, as well as others, because they appeared to him in their own nature reasonable and fit to be done; for so the whole of what God requires of man, is fitly distinguished into some things which he commands because they are just, and some things that are just because he commands them. Prop. 5. Adam was endued in his creation with a sufficient ability and habitude to conform to this whole law, both natural and positive; in which ability and habitude his original recitude did consist. This proposition carries in it the main truth we have now in hand, therefore requires to be more distinctly insisted on. There are two things in it to be considered-the thing itself he was endued with the manner of the endowment. 1. The thing itself wherewith he was endued. That was uprightness, rectitude, (otherwise called the image of God, though that expression comprehends more than we now speak of, as his immortality, dominion over the inferior creatures, &c.) which uprightness or rectitude consisted in the habitual conformity, or conformability, of all his natural powers to this whole law of God; and is therefore considerable two ways, viz. in relation to its subject, and its rule. 1. In relation to its subject; that was the whole soul, (in some sense it may be said the whole man,) even the several powers of it. And here we are led to consider the parts of this rectitude, for 'tis co-extended (if that phrase may be allowed) with its subject, and lies spread out into the several powers of the soul; for had any power been left destitute of it, such is the frame of man, and the dependence of his natural powers on each other, in order to action, that it had disabled him to obey, and had destroyed his rectitude; for bonum non oritur nisi ex causis integris, malum vero ex quovis defectu. And hence (as Davenant well observes) according to the parts (if I may so speak) of the subject wherein it was, man's original rectitude must be understood to consist of, 1. A perfect illumination of mind to understand and Know the will of God. 2. A compliance of heart and will therewith. 3. An obedient subordination of the sensitive appetite, and other inferior powers, that in nothing they might resist the former. That it comprehends all these, appears by comparing Col. iii. 10. where the image of God, wherein man was created, is said to consist in knowledge, that hath its seat and subject in the mind, with Eph. iv. 24. where righteousness and holiness are also mentioned; the one whereof consists in equity towards men, the other in loyalty and devotedness to God; both which necessarily suppose the due framing of the other powers of the soul, to the ducture of an enlightened mind. And besides, that work of sanctification (which in these scriptures is expressly called a renovation of man according to the image of God wherein he was created) doth in other scriptures appear (as the forementioned author also observes) to consist of parts proportionable to these I mention, viz. illumination of mind, Ephes. i. 18. conversion of heart, Ps. li. 10. victory over concupiscence, Rom. vi. 7, throughout. 2. Consider this recitude in relation to its rule; that is, the will of God revealed, or the law of God. Sin is the transgression of the law; and accordingly righteousness must needs be conformity to the law; viz. actual righteousness consists in actual conformity to the law; that habitual rectitude which Adam was furnished with in his creation, (of which we are speaking,) in an habitual conformity, or an ability to conform to the same law. This habitual conformity was, as of the whole soul, so to the whole law, i. e. to both the parts or kinds of it, natural and positive. He was furnished with particular principles, inclining him to comply with whatsoever the law of nature had laid before him; and with a general principle, disposing him to yield to whatsoever any positive law should lay before him as the will of God. And if it be said, | (in reference to the former of these,) that this law of nature impressed upon Adam's soul, was his very rectitude; therefore how can this rectitude be a conformity to this law? I answer, 1. A law is twofold, regulans, regulata.® 2. The law of nature impressed upon the soul of Adam, must be considered;-1. as subjected in his mind; so it consisted of certain practical notions about good and evil, right and wrong, &c.-2. as subjected in his heart, so it consisted in certain habitual inclinations to conform to those principles. Now these inclinations of the heart, though they are a rule to actions, they are yet something ruled in reference to those notions in the mind; and their conformity thereto makes one part of original rectitude. And those notions, though they are a rule to these inclinations, yet they are something ruled in reference to the will of God signified by them; and in the conformity thereto, consists another part of this original rectitude. 2. We have to consider the manner of this endowment. And as to this, 'tis much disputed among the schoolmen, whether it were natural or supernatural. I shall only lay down, in few words, what I conceive to be clear and indisputable. 1. If by natural, you mean essential, (whether constitutively, or consecutively,) so original righteousness was not natural to man; for then he could never have lost it, without the loss of his being. 2. If by natural, you mean connatural, i. e. concreate with the nature of man, and consonant thereto, so I doubt not but it was natural to him. Prop. 6. This rectitude of man's nature, could not but infer and include his actual blessedness, while he should act according to it. According to the tenor of the covenant, it could not but infer it. And consider this rectitude in itself, it must needs include it: the rectitude of his understanding including his knowledge of the highest good; and the rectitude of his will and affections, the acceptance and enjoyment thereof; as Augustine in this case, nullum bonum abesset homini quod recta voluntas optare posset, &c. Thus far of the holiness and blessedness of man's first state. It follows to speak of the mutability of it, and of his fall as depending thereon. Doct. 2. That man's defection from his primitive state was merely voluntary, and from the unconstrained choice of his own mutable and self-determining will. For the asserting of this truth, take the following propositions: Prop. 1. That the nature of man is now become universally depraved and sinful. This, Scripture is full of,g and experience and common observation puts it beyond dispute. 'Tis left then that sin must have had some original among men. Prop. 2. The pure and holy nature of God could never be the original of man's sin. This is evident in itself. God disclaims it; nor can any affirm it of him without denying his very Being. He could not be the cause of unholiness, but by ceasing to be holy, which would suppose him mutably holy; and if either God or man must be confessed mutable, 'tis no difficulty where to lay it; whatever he is, he is essentially; and necessity of exist ence, of being always what he is, i remains everlastingly the fundamental attribute of his Being. 3. 'Tis blasphemous and absurd to talk of two principles, (as the Manichees of old,) the one good per se, and the cause of all good; the other evil per se, and the cause of all evil. Bradwardine's two arguments, 1. that this would suppose two gods, two independent beings, 2. that it would suppose an evil god, do sufficiently convince this to be full both of blasphemy and contradiction. 4. It was not possible that either external objects, or the temptation of the devil, should necessitate the will of man to sin. External objects could not; for that were to reject all upon God; for if he create objects with such an allective power in them, and create such an appetite in man as cannot but work inordinately and sinfully towards those objects, it must needs infer his efficacious necessitation of sin, being it would destroy the truth already established, that God created man with such a rectitude as that h Deut. xxxii. 4. Psal. v. 4. 3 John 11. i James i. 17. k Bradwardine de causa Dei. there was a sufficient ability in his superior powers for the cohibition and restraint of the inferior, that they should not work inordinately towards their objects. The devil could not do it for the same reason, having no way to move the will of man but by the proposal of objects; yet that by this means (which he could in many respects manage most advantageously) he did much help forward the first sin, Scripture leaves us not to doubt. 5. The whole nature of sin consisting only in a defect, no other cause need be designed of it than a defective; i. e. an understanding, will, and inferior powers, however originally good, yet mutably and defectively so. I shall not insist to prove that sin is no positive being; but I take the argument to be irrefragable, (notwithstanding the cavils made against it,) that is drawn from that common maxim, that omne ens positivum est vel primum, vel à primo. And that of Dionysius the Areopagite is an ingenious one: he argues that no being can be evil per se; for then it must be immutably, to which no evil can be, for to be always the same, is a certain property of goodness; 'tis so even of the highest goodness. And hence sin being supposed only a defect, a soul that is only defectibly holy, might well enough be the cause of it; i. e. the deficient cause. Nor is it in the least strange that man should be at first created with a defectible holiness; for if he were immutably holy, either it must be ex naturâ, or ex gratia: ex naturâ it could not be, for that would suppose him God; if it were ex gratiâ, then it must be free; then it might be, or might not be; therefore there was no incongruity in it that it should not be. And indeed it was most congruous that God having newly made such a creature, furnished with such powers, so capable of government by a law, of being moved by promises and threats, he should for some time hold him as a viator, in a state of trial unconfirmed, (as he did also the innocent angels,) that it might be seen how he would behave himself towards his Maker, and that he should be rewardable and punishable accordingly, in a state that should be everlasting and unchangeable: the liberty therefore of the viators and the comprehensors, m Gibieuf well distinguishes into inchoata or consummabilis, and perfecta or consummata; the former such as Adam's was at his creation; the latter such as is the state of angels and saints in glory; and as his would have been had he held out and persisted innocent through the intended time of trial. It was therefore no strange thing that man should be created defectible; it was as little strange that a defectible creature should deficere. For the manner of that defection, (whether error of the understanding preceded, or inconsideration only, and a neglect of its office,) with the great difficulties some imagine herein, I waive discourse about them; judging that advice good and sober, for to consider more how sin may be gotten out of the world, than how it came in. Though 'tis most probable there was in the instant of temptation a mere suspension of the understanding's 's act, (not as previous to the sin, but as a part of it,) and thereupon a sudden precipitation of will, as Estius doth well determine. 6. Man being created mutable as to his holiness, must needs be so as to his happiness too. And that both upon a legal account, (for the law had determined that if he did sin he must die,) and also upon a natural; for it was not possible that his soul being once depraved by sin, the powers of it vitiated, their order each to other, and towards their objects, broken and interrupted, there should remain a disposition and aptitude to converse with the highest good. The use follows, which shall be only in certain practical inferences that will issue from these truths, partly considered singly and severally, partly together and in conjunction. From the First. 1. Did God create man upright as hath been shown? then how little reason had man to sin! how little reason had he to desert God! to be weary of his first estate! Could God's making him, his making him upright, be a reason why he should sin against him? was his directing his heart, and the natural course of his affections towards himself, a reason why he should forsake him? What was there in his state that should make it m Gibieuf de libertate Dei et creaturæ. 1 Dion de Div. nom. grievous to him? Was his duty too much for him? God made him upright, so that every part of it was connatural to him. Was his privilege too little? He knew, and loved, and enjoyed the highest and infinite good. O think then how unreasonable and disingenuous a thing sin was! that a creature that was nothing but a few hours ago, now a reasonable being, capable of God, should yet sin! Urge your hearts with this, we are too apt to think ourselves unconcerned in Adam's sin; we look upon ourselves too abstractly, we should remember we are members of a community, and it should be grievous to us to think that our species hath dealt so unkindly and unworthily with God and besides, do not we sin daily after the similitude of Adam's transgression? and is not sin as unreasonable and unjust a thing as ever? 2. Was our primitive state so good and happy, how justly may we reflect and look back towards our first state! how fitly might we take up Job's words! O that I were as in months past;-as in the days of my youth;—when the Almighty was yet with me;-when I put on righte ousness and it clothed me;-when my glory was fresh in me, &c. With what sadness may we call to mind the things that are past, and the beginnings of ancient time! when there was no stain upon our natures, no cloud upon our minds, no pollution upon our hearts; when with pure and undefiled souls we could embrace and rest, and rejoice in the eternal and incomprehensible good! When we remember these things, do not our bowels turn? are not our souls poured out within us? From the Second. 1. Did man so voluntarily ruin himself; how unlikely is he now to be his own saviour! He that was a self-destroyer from the beginning, that ruined himself as soon as God had made him, is he likely now to save himself? Is it easier for him to recover his station than to have kept it ? or hath he improved himself by sinning, and gained strength by his fall for a more difficult undertaking? Is he grown better natured towards himself and his God, than he was at first? 2. How little reason hath he to blame God, though he finally perish! What would he have had God to have done more to prevent it; he gave his law to direct him, his threatening to warn him; his promise for his encourage ment was evidently implied; his nature was sufficiently disposed to improve and comport with all these: yet he sins! Is God to be charged with this? Sins upon no necessity, with no pretence; but that he must be seeking out inventions, trying experiments, assaying to better his state, as plainly despising the law, suspecting the truth, envying the greatness, asserting and aspiring to the sovereignty and Godhead of his Maker. Had we (any of us) a mind to contend with God about this matter, how would we order our cause? how would we state our quarrel? If we complain that we should be condemned and ruined all in one man; that is to complain that we are Adam's children. A child might as well complain that he is the son of a beggar or a traitor, and charge it as injustice upon the prince or law of the land that he is not born to a patrimony; this is a misery to him, but no man will say it is a wrong. And can it be said we are wronged by the common Ruler of the world, that we do not inherit from our father the righteousness and felicity he had wilfully lost long before we were his children? If we think it hard we should be tied to terms we never consented to, might not an heir as well quarrel with the magistrate, that he suffers him to become liable to his father's debts, and to lie in prison if he have not to pay? But besides, who can imagine but we should have consented, had all mankind been at that time existent in innocency together? i. e. let the case be stated thus: Suppose Adam, our common parent, to have had all his children together with him before the Lord, while the covenant of works was not as yet made, and while as yet God was not under any engagement to the children of men. Let it be supposed, that he did propound it to the whole race of mankind together, that he would capitulate with their common parent on their behalf, according to the terms of that first covenant; if he stood, they should stand, if he fall, they must all fall with him. Let it be considered, that if this had not been consented to, God might n Job xxix. 2, 4, 5 14, 20 |