thus defirable, can be confiftent with a fense of its real benefit and lafting importance.

Some proper Rules to direct our INQUIRIES after TRUTH.

We have seen that there are truths of different natures, and evidences of different kinds and degrees; and it is no fmall proof of the dignity of human nature, that, by the use of those faculties with which we are endowed, we are enabled to compare propofitions that differ, and inveftigate many truths which do not appear obvious at first fight.

This naturally fuggefts to us, that there are different methods to be pursued for the attainment of truth, according to their different natures, and the evidences of which they are capable *. And tho' the evidence of our fenfes is the moft natural, and in fome cases inconteftible, yet it is alfo certain, that there are many propofitions, of which there is a reasonable and fufficient moral evidence of their truth †.

Some of the rules and directions neceffary to direct our inquiries, are as follow:

1. An humble and fincere addrefs to the great Author of your being, for his favourable affiftance and concurrence with you.

2. Propofe to yourself as the only design of all your reasonings and inquiries, to find out truth.

3. Examine all the circumstances of the cafe proposed, in the most careful and deliberate manner that you can. Rafh conclufions, without duly weighing the reasons upon which they are founded, and what evidence there may be on the oppofite fide, is the reproach of intelligent nature.

4. Make fuch inferences from them as your fober

* With respect to the matter of Divine Revelation, as well as Human Teftimony, confult Dr. Watts's Logic.

+ Ditton on the Resurrection of Chrift, from page 123 to 194 of Moral Evidence in general.. g3

reafon,

reafon, without any art or management, does itself freely prompt you to make.

5. Never drop the inquiry till you have brought it to fome determinate iffue.

6. Let your perfuafion be unprejudiced, free as poffible from prepoffeffion, and an undue attachment to the fentiments of others, tho' under the fanction of public authority. Nothing ought to be the governing predominant principle to direct our inquiries, but the evidence of its being the mind and will of God and in judging of points of faith, that depends on the authority of the infpired books, the expreffions taken from the fcriptures fhould be made the measure of interpreting fuch as are not taken from the fcrip ture, and not the contrary.

7. Though you are not to pay an implicit regard to the opinions and fentiments of others, we may in many cafes lawfully and prudently confult men of wisdom and years, obfervation and experience, in order to affift our inquiries, both in points of a civil, moral, and religious nature*,

There are, fays Dr. Watts +, five eminent means or methods, whereby the mind is improved in the knowledge of things; and thefe are, obfervation, reading, inftruction by lectures, conversation and meditation.

Obfervation is the notice that we take of all occurrences and concerns of human life, whether they are fenfible or intellectual, whether relating to perfons or things, to ourselves, or others: all things which we fee, which we hear, or feel, which we perceive by fenfe or confcioufnefs, or which we know in a direc manner, with fcarce any exercife of our reafoning powers, may be included under the general name of obfervation.

Dr. Watts's Logic, p. 231, & feq. See likewife Grove's Moral Philof. vol. II. p. 59 & feq.

Improvement of the Mind, p. 30. illuârated by a variety of Rules and Directions, from p. 60 to 21 1.

Reading

Reading is another and very confiderable means or method of knowledge, whereby we acquaint ourselves with what other men have written or publifhed to the world in their writings; by this means we partake of the fentiments, reafonings, and improvements of all the learned world, in the most remote nations, and in former ages, almost from the beginning of mankind.

Converfation is another method of improving our minds; wherein, by mutual discourse and inquiry, we learn the fentiments of others, as well as communicate our fentiments to them in the fame manner, fometimes between a teacher and learner; but the profit is frequently mutual. Under this head we may also rank difputes of various kinds.

Public or private lectures, are fuch verbal inftructions as are given by a teacher, while the learner attends in filence. Thus religion is learnt from the pul- . pit-philofophy, or theology from the profeffor's chair, mathematics by a teacher, &c.

Meditation, or ftudy, includes all thofe exercises of the mind, whereby we render all the former methods useful for our increase in true knowledge and wisdom. It is by meditation we come to confirm our memories of things that pass through our thoughts in the occurrences of life, in our own experiences, and in the obfervations we make. It is by'meditation that we draw various inferences, and establish in our minds general principles of knowledge. It is by meditation that we compare the various ideas which we derive from our fenfes, or from the operations of our fouls, and join them in propofitions. It is by meditation, that we fix in our memory whatfoever we learn, and form our own judg ment of the truth or falfhood, the ftrength or weaknefs of what others write. It is meditation or study that draws out long chains of argument, and fearches and finds deep and difficult truths, which before lay cncealed in darkness.

It would be a needlefs thing to prove, that our own g 4

foli

folitary meditations, together with the few obfervations that the most part of mankind are capable of making, are not fufficient of themselves to lead us to the attainment of any confiderable proportion of knowledge, at leaft in an age fo much improved as ours is, without the affiftance of converfation and reading, and other proper inftructions that are to be attained in our days; yet each of these five methods have their peculiar advantages, whereby they affift each other, and contribute to increase our knowledge.

But it is time to apply the preceding remarks to the fubfequent history.

A Proteftants and Diffenters from the church of Rome, we are obliged to admit the right of private judgment, in oppofition to our receiving any thing for true on the credit of the Pope as infallible judge, or (as others of that communion express themselves) on the judgment of the Pope, in conjunction with a council of bifhops; and if this is not admitted, how can we juftify the conduct of our principal reformers? Did they diffent without inquiring? and, if they made free to examine for themselves, did they not, by neceffary confequence, affert the right of every man to do the fame for himself? And if this be done with care and fincere veneration for truth, if we honeftly endeavour to avoid every error, we may be affured, whatever may be the refult of our inquiry, we shall not at the bar of God ftand chargeable with voluntary ignorance and criminal miftake.

One principal part of our inquiry, as Proteftants, is, how we fhall ftrip Popery of its strongest bulwark, the pretended infallibility and authority of the church, explode their pretended miracles, and vindicate the principles of Proteftantifm against all their attempts to blacken and vilify it; vindicate the authority of Scripture as the rule of a Chriftian's faith and worship, in oppofition to tradition; point out their various inventions and fuperftitions in worship and difcipline; fhew the novelty and abfurdity of many of their cere

monies;

monies; difplay the abfurdity of their pretended doctrines of tranfubftantiation, the grofs prefumption of absolution, and the immoral tendency of indulgences; and, above all, convince them of the repugnancy of perfecution to the spirit and practice of genuine Chriftianity and, to do this the more effectually, acquaint yourself with the most authentic proofs of their grofs corruptions; the commencement and confirmation of them from the best hiftorians of their church; the decrees of councils and fynods; and be able to prove the hypothefes you advance by unquestionable authorities: for they will roundly deny, or artfully evade, whatever they are not qualified to vindicate; and defpife the proofs brought by Proteftants, however well fupported. Tis, methinks, a laudable acquifition to be able well to defend and fupport the Chriftian religion against the fubtilty and artifice of thofe enemies of our holy religion; and though I cannot point out in what part of England it is at prefent prevailing, Ireland abounds with them; and I am well informed, that in fome counties of England their numbers are very confiderable, which should animate Proteftants to be upon their guard against the delufive fpirit of popery.

A late worthy prelate obferves *,That popish superftition is a more active principle, with regard to conqueft, than rational proteftantifm. The firft piques itself on destroying and extirpating the enemies of God; the latter, regarding none as the enemies of God on account of error, aims only at a rational defence. While proteftantifm therefore retains its proper influence in the minds of men, it may be a match for popish fuperftition; what it wants in fury, it makes up in fteadiness. This truth our forefathers have twice. experienced in our own country." However, he concludes, upon the whole of fuch arguments, that proteftantifm calmly prefents herself to the reafon, while popery seizes the paffions of men; and hence modern • Eftimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times.

popery,