on. But this is a diftinction which I do not well understand, not being able to conceive any other Matter or Body, but what is Physical. 'Tis true indeed the Object of Geometry may in fome Senfe, be faid to be extenfion. But what Extenfion is it? not that which is Local and Material, but Intelligible Extenfion, that is not Matter, but the Idea of Matter, or, not Matter as it is in Nature, but as it is in Idea. There feems to be a neceffity for this,not only upon the Confideration largely infifted upon in the former Page 51. part, viz. That the Figures which Geometry contemplates, are Ideal or Intelligible Figures only, as being confider'd according to fuch Exactnefs of Perfection as they have not in Nature, but also because Geometry being a strict Science, must have a stable, neceffary and immutable Object for its Contemplation, fuch as the Natural and Corporeal World cannot afford, and is to be found only in the Intelligible. That Extenfion then which Geometry contemplates as its formal Object, is not Corporeal Extension, any more than the Figures are Corporeal Figures, but Ideal or Intelligible Extenfion, which has nothing of Corporeity in it, as not being a proper Extenfion, but only fo call'd from the Power which it has of repre fenting it to our Thoughts. There is no fuch thing then as Geometrical Matter, and that becaufe the Object of Geometry is not Matter, but Idea. But then the Confequence of this is that the Distinction of Geometrial and Physical Mat ter ter is without due Foundation in pure Reafon. And indeed it has only a confufe Imagination to fupport it, as arifing only from want of a right Apprehenfion of the Abftractedness of the Science of Geometry, which is prefumed to Abftract from Matter not in the reality of the Thing but only rationally and as to the manner of Confideration, and fo to have fomething really Material for its Object. But this Miftake we have already rectify'd, fhewing that Geometry is every whit See Part I. p. 59. as Abstract a Science as Metaphyficks, and therefore for the prefent fuppofing no other Matter but what is Phyfical, I fhall confine my Confidera tion to that. 12. Now of this I think the most fimple and genuine Idea that will offer it felf to the Mind that attentively confiders it,is that of an Extended Being. To this fome perhaps would join Impenitrability, Divisibility, Solidity, Hardness, &c. But I think when we have faid Extended Being, we have faid what fufficiently expreffes the Nature of the thing as to a general Conception of it, and that all thofe Characters which are or can be further added, will be found to be either Properties belonging to Bodies, or fuch Sentiments which we have in our felves upon their Occafion. Now as for thofe Sentiments which we have in our felves upon the Occafion of Bodies, and are apt confusedly to transfer from our selves to them, such as Heat, Cold, Co lour Princip. Philof. p. 25. Act. 4. lour, Hardness, &c. we must have a care how we make them enter into the Idea or Effence of Body. For these things do not so much as really belong to the Nature of Bodies, as being not (as is ordinarily conceiv'd) fenfible Qualities really inherent in them, but only certain Senfations or Modalities of our own Souls, occafion'd by them, as fhall be fhewn hereafter. Des Cartes indeed will tell you that fuch Qualities do not belong to the Nature of Body because they may be feparated from it, the Nature of Body ftill remaining entire. But I believe it may and will hereafter be made appear that they were never fo much as in it. And then as to the Properties, tho' they are (what the others are not) really appendant to Body, yet they ought not to be taken into the Idea of it, which ought to comprehend no more than the general Reason or Effence of the thing, that with which it can, and without which it cannot be conceiv'd, and that is Extended Being. He indeed that touches Bodies feels fomething elfe, and fo calls one Hot and another Cold, one Sweet and another Sour (how truly fhall be confider'd in its place) but he that thinks of them need think of nothing else, and can think of nothing else belonging to Bodies but what fuppofes and is built upon the other. But if he will add more because there are more things that may be truly affirm'd of Body befides that it is a Be ing Extended, he may as well put together all the Properties that belong to a Figure comprehended within three right Lines, and call that a Triangle. Which if he does, he will have enough to Define, and nothing to Demonftrate. 13. So now the Queftion more explicitly propofed, will be, Whether Extended Being can Think? In answer to which I fhall not fay, That as Extended Being is what we are to understand by Matter or Body, fo Thinking Being is that which constitutes the Idea or Elfence of the Soul, being not as yet supposed to know whether I have a Soul or no as not knowing what it is that thinks in me. But this however the Evidence of my Perception will warrant me to fay at prefent, That Extenfion and Thought are two diftin&t Ideas, diftinct in their whole Kind, as distinct as a Circle and a Triangle, or as any other two things can poffibly be from one anther. And therefore as I can affuredly fay, That a Circle is not a Triangle, because I conceive them diftinct, fo for the fame Reason and therefore with the fame Affurance, I can fay,That Extenfion is not Thought. And I have no caufe to doubt of the Goodness of that Reason since we who know things by their Ideas, have no other way to difcern the difference of them but by the Diversity of their Refpective Ideas. 14. Thus far then our way is clear. Extenfion is not Thought, that I diftinctly perceive. Sup Suppofe now I fhould further fay, that as Extenfion and Thought are diftinct because the Ideas we have of them are fo, fo an Extended Being and a Thinking Being are no lefs diftinct because we have as diftinct Ideas of them. An Extended Being then is one thing and a Thinking Being is another, and therefore as a Thinking Being is not an Extended Being, so neither is an Extended Being a Thinking Being. And if an Extended Being be not a Thinking Being, then is it not a plain Confequence that an Extended Being cannot Think? which way of Arguing is according to the Cartefian Principles, and differs very little either as to Matter or Form, from that used by Des Cartes, when he fays, Omne id quod poteft Cogitare eft Mens, fed cum Mens & Corpus realiter Diftinguntur, nullum Corpus est Mens, Ergo nullum Corpus poteft Cogitare. Refp. ad fecundas Ob ject. p. 69. 15. This indeed is a dispatching Demonftration, if it be One. But the Conclufion turns fo fhort, and comes fo quick upon one, that it seems by the very Surprize of it (as all Arguments of that fort do) to be fallacious. But we fhall be the better able to judge of it if we reduce it to Form, and then it will stand in this Posture, If an Extended Being be real- But |