we shall find it is their conforming to ideas, e. g., ‘a true friend' is one who has all the characters comprehended in the idea of friend. This correspondence with an idea of itself is actual, if the Being is a term or object of actual thought, is actually known. It is potential or aptitudinal, if the Being is capable of being a term or object of true thought, is knowable, is capable of determining and terminating a true concept of itself.

17. Can we say that every being is true, conformed and conformable to a true idea of itself, known and knowable for what it is? To answer the question satisfactorily we must assume certain propositions which will be proved, independently of the present article, in other places.

God is an eternal, self-existent, infinitely perfect Being, possessing in His simple, infinite essence all pure perfection in an infinitely perfect way, so that every Being is a Being, only inasmuch as it is in its grade and measure a far-off, limited imitation of God. This infinite, "ocean of all-perfect Being" is the eternal object of the Divine Mind, which comprehends it and its imitability and all its possible imitations, and consequently all finite things, in eternal, infinitely perfect thought. Hence every existible being is an actual object of eternal, true thought, and is, therefore, true.

Furthermore, nothing exists, or has ever existed, or will ever exist, even a child's transient thought, which God has not foreknown and ordained or permitted, and produced or cooperated to produce; so that there never can be an existent Being which does not depend for its existence on the divine thought, just as a work of art depends for its existence on the mind of the artist who conceived it. Hence, again, every existent being is an object of eternal, perfect thought, and, is therefore, true.

Lastly, among existent imitations of God there are finite intelligences very limited indeed in capacity, but still modeled after God's own mind and so capable of apprehending more or

less perfectly the Divine Being and its imitations. In regard to these, therefore, also every Being is true, i. e., capable of determining and terminating true knowledge of itself.

Creatures correspond to God's knowledge of them and are capable of making themselves known, and tend to make themselves known just for what they are to finite intellects made in the image and likeness of God.

All things, then, are true, primarily, in regard to the Divine Mind in which they are actually, perfectly and eternally represented, secondarily, in regard to finite minds in which they are capable of being more or less perfectly represented. Hence, we might say that things are ultimately true because they correspond to the divine ideas; and that our thoughts are true because, being conformed to things, they thus correspond with the thought of God.

18. Hence when things are spoken of as false, the epithet can only be applied to them by a metonymy, i. e., as accidentally, by their likeness to other things, giving occasion to the imperfect finite mind to judge them to be what they are not. But in regard to God, nothing can be called false; even the sinful act itself, though in discord with His law, is eternally before His mind in all its deformity.

ARTICLE IV.-GOODNESS.

19. We have said that the perfections of a thing are those elements really or virtually distinct, which constitute its essence and render it capable of attaining and holding the place proportioned to its nature in the commonwealth of things. Now, everything has, or may be conceived to have, an inclination, tendency, appetite for all that goes to fill up the measure of its adequate perfection; and that which is in any way capable of satisfying such inclination, tendency, etc., is said to be good for that Being. Hence, goodness is usually defined, entity as

appetible. But as entity is appetible only inasmuch as it really or apparently, completely or partially, perfects that which desires it, the more radical definition of goodness would be, entity as perfective, or Being, as connoting some appetite, tendency or capacity which it is capable of satisfying.

20. That, then, which perfects a Being is good for it. Now, between that which perfects and that which is perfected, between the perfective and the perfectible, there may be only a mental distinction, e. g., we may consider 'a beautiful flower as perfected by all that which makes it what it is, and we may even attribute to it a sort of metaphorical joy and gladness in the possession of itself.' In this case we have Being as selfperfective, good for itself, good in itself. This is called the absolute goodness of a thing, i. e., its goodness in and for itself, apart from all reference to other things really distinct from itself.

This absolute goodness is adequate, if the Being has all that is needed to constitute its essence, to perfect its activities, and completely to satisfy all its tendencies, capacities, etc.; else it is only partial or inadequate.

If, on the contrary, we do not consider the Being as selfperfective, but as a perfective, meeting the demands, of something really other than itself, we have what is called its relative goodness, i. e., its goodness, a perfectiveness, in regard to another. The various ways in which a thing may be relatively good will give us the divisions of goodness in the next paragraph.

NOTE (1). There is another sense in which a Being may be called absolutely good, i. e., if it has all pure perfection without lack, or limit, or dependence. In this sense, God alone is absolutely good.

(2).-Among absolutely good and adequately good things one may be better than another, i. e., if its nature requires and

admits higher and greater perfections, e. g., 'an adequately good man is a better Being than an adequately good hummingbird.'

21. That which is an object of desire or affection may be so, either for its own sake, or for the sake of something different from itself. In the latter case we have what is called the useful good, the goodness of utility. Such an object is really desirable, yet not in and for itself, but as a means, remote or proximate, for attaining something which is desirable in and for itself, i. e., its relative goodness consists in its usefulness.

Again, that which is desirable in and for itself, may be so, either for the sake of its objective entity, as perfective of the appetent subject, e. g., 'wholesome food'; or merely for the subjective pleasure it affords, e. g., 'a cigar.' The latter gives us the pleasurable or pleasure-giving good, i. e., an object in which a vital faculty, spiritual or sensual, finds rest and repose, whether it be an object really perfective of the appetent subject or not.

Lastly, that which by its objective entity is perfective of another is called the befitting good, i. e., that which is fitted to perfect and is, therefore, a suitable object of appetition for a Being bent on acquiring its perfection.

Taken in a broad sense of the word, in which sense it is also called natural good, the Befitting Good is that which by itself is perfective of a complete nature or of any natural faculty, e. g., 'food is a natural good of animal nature,' 'knowledge is a natural good of the mind.'

Taken in a stricter sense, however, the Befitting Good is that which perfects, and so is a fitting, congruous object of desire for a rational Being as such, i. e., for a Being endowed with the power of deliberate, responsible choice. In this sense it is also called moral good.

NOTE (1).-One and the same object may be at once usefully, pleasurably, naturally, morally good for the same subject. But as a moral good, it is desirable under one aspect, as a pleasurable good under another, etc., e. g., 'study,' ‘play,' 'prayer,' etc.

(2).-True good is that which really perfects the appetent subjects as a simple or composite whole. Apparent good is that which, though desired, does not so perfect the subject. Where there are, as there are in every finite Being, many different appetites or tendencies, all other appetites should be subordinate to the primary specific tendency of the Being; what is unsuitable to it, though agreeing with a lower tendency, is not the true good of the Being.

(3)-Supernatural good, in the strict sense of the word, is that which perfects a being in a manner above the exigencies of its own, or of any finite nature, e. g., 'sanctifying grace, the beatific vision of God,' etc.

22. Every Real Being, as such, is absolutely good. For it is good for itself, as constituting itself the Being that it is, as distinguished from mere nothing.

Every Being is relatively good, i. e., good for something else, not for everything else. The Infinite Being, God, is good for all finite Being, as their exemplar, efficient and final cause; and finite Beings, in their turn, may be said to be good for God, inasmuch as being imitations of Himself and the work of His hands they are objects of His complacence and loving care. Again, even among finite Beings, one is good for another. For the universe is a cosmos of relations and correlations, so that it is literally true that a leaf cannot fall from a tree without affecting the equilibrium of the whole. Each material element can enter into some sort of combination with some other. Substance is good for accident, accident for substance, part for whole, or whole for part. Some Beings supply