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anxiously turned towards the fort of Phillour, some twenty-four miles off, on the banks of the Sutlej.* To throw into it a small force of Europeans, and thus rescue it from the hands of the native guard who now held it, was the first care. It was at once decided to send off a small body that night, who, by a forced march, might take the guard by surprise, and forestall any of their mutinous designs, without having raised any suspicion of the movement. At sunset that evening 150 men of the 8th under Major Baines, two horseartillery guns, with spare men and horses, under Lieutenants Sankey and Dobbin, and a small detachment of the 2d Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Probyn (which regiment happened to be passing through Jullundhur), were despatched, and entered the fort at Phillour before daylight the next morning, having marched the twenty-four miles with out a single halt. The guns and cavalry, which had only been sent as escort on the road, and with a view to being used for the recovery of the fort in the event of its having been seized by the Sepoys, were at once sent back with fifty of the Europeans to guard the guns, 100 having been left to hold the fort; and Lieutenant Dobbin, with some spare gunners and horses, also remained to work a couple of guns "in the open," if necessary; four additional 6-pounders were also taken out of the fort-stores, and were carried back to Jullundhur.
Earlier in the day, a measure scarcely less important for the safety of Phillour had been adopted. Mr Brown, the superintendent of telegraphs in that district, started off in an express mail-cart, carrying with him complete apparatus for opening a signalling-office inside the fort. A messenger was also despatched to Loodiana to apprise Mr G. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner, of the state
of things, and to warn him to guard the bridge of boats across the Sutlej with some of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, in case the Sepoys attempted to seize or destroy it.
Such were the precautions taken at Jullundhur for securing Phillour: the measures adopted for the security of Jullundhur itself, and the peace of the town and district, were equally prompt and vigorous. The cantonment at that time contained one troop (1st troop of 1st Brigade) of Horse Artillery, under Major Olpherts (Major J. Brind commanding the Artillery division); H. M.'s 8th Foot, under Colonel Longfield, Colonel Hartley acting as brigadier; the 6th Light Cavalry, under Major N. D. Barton; the 36th N. I., under Captain S. B. Faddy; and the 61st N. I. under Major J. C. Innes. The Cavalry lines were at the extreme right of cantonments; next to them came the Artillery, with the 36th N. I. completing the line; and the European barracks at right angles forming the left flank, while the lines of the 61st N. I. were on the opposite side of the station. The first step taken was to send 100 men of H. M.'s 8th to the Artillery lines, for the greater protection of the guns; and when the additional guns from Phillour came in, two of them were sent down to the European barracks. The office of the electric telegraph was removed from the 61st lines, and carried into one of the Artillery barracks. The guns were disposed in perfect readiness at a moment's notice. Two of them were pointed so as to command the Cavalry parade, two more to sweep that of the 36th N. I., while the rest remained in position on their own ground.† A party of mounted artillerymen patrolled the station at night. Major J. Brind, who undertook to act as permanent station field-officer, was indefatigable, visiting the different parts of the station
*Of the great value and importance of this fort an account will be given in speaking of it subsequently.
Against this arrangement of the guns an appeal was made by the Sepoys through their officers, as reflecting on their stanchness; but Major Olpherts parried the charge, by observing that some of the guns pointed also to the Artillery barracks, and their position remained unaltered. Horses were traced to two of the limbers of the guns all night, and were kept harnessed during the day in their lines.
at all hours of the day and night. Major Olpherts and his subalterns passed the night at their guns, and during the day one officer and half the men were always on duty. Colonel Hartley and his staff slept at the Artillery orderly-room. The ladies and families belonging to the 8th Queen's moved down for the night to one of the barracks vacated for them, and the other ladies and families of the station were accommodated in the Artillery schoolroom and library.*
Such were the chief measures by which the peace of the station was secured.t They were enough to show the Sepoys how little they were trusted, and what awaited them if they rose.
The care of the Civil lines, with the public buildings, and the peace of the town, were in Captain Farrington's hands. His first hope lay in the Rajah of Kupoorthulla, Rundheer Sing Alloowalla, whose territory lies between Jullundhur and the river Beas. The Rajah was at the time absent on a pilgrimage to Hurdwar; but his Vakeel was quickly with Captain Farrington, and ready to carry out his wishes, in anticipation of his master's sanction and approval. The Rajah had, however, that very day arrived at Phillour on his return, and here his Vakeel met him with the tidings of the Delhi outbreak, and the Deputy Commissioner's application for aid. No sooner had the Rajah arrived at Phillour than seditious emissaries of the 3d N. I., quartered there, got into his camp, and began to tamper with his men.
the first discovery of this, and of the tidings from Jullundhur, the Rajah at once broke up his camp, and marched straight into Jullundhur. In the mean time two guns and some 500 men had come in from Kupoorthulla, and had been posted by Captain Farrington over the different public buildings, the treasury, jail, &c., so as to act in any sudden emergency. The Rajah had no sooner reached Jullundhur, than he made over to Captain Farrington all the troops that had been attending him, and by every means in his power strengthened the hands of Government.
As much mention will be made of the unwavering, unflinching course pursued by this Rajah in a late period, it may be interesting to notice briefly his origin and personal character.
Rundheer Sing Alloowalla is the grandson of Futteh Sing (of that ilk), who held so conspicuous a position among the Sikh sirdars in the earlier years of Runjeet Sing. He it was with whom the future Maharajah exchanged turbans in token of undying friendship, and who, conjointly with (then) Sirdar Runjeet Sing, signed the treaty of 1806. The friendship between the "turban brothers," so solemnly sealed, saved the independence of the Alloowalla Misl, when all the others were absorbed by the "Lion of the Punjab " into the great Sikh kingdom. The son of Futteh Sing, however, fared worse. In the intrigues of 1845 he was believed to have played false to the English Government; and in consequence, with other Rajahs of
* Mrs Fagan (the wife of Captain R. C. Fagan of the Artillery, Engineer officer at Jullundhur) was, it is believed, the single exception; she did not once sleep out of her house. Her calmness and presence of mind on the night of the outbreak will be spoken of hereafter.
+ One minor precaution, perhaps not generally known, may be here noticed. The Cavalry lines are, as has been mentioned, on the extreme right, with the Artillery lines next to them, separated from each other by a broad roadway, which runs across the station, leading to the Civil lines. It was felt to be by no means an improbable manœuvre that the cavalry, whenever they might rise, would charge the guns in flank. To prevent this was a great object. One suggestion was to cut a deep trench alongside the road, another to set up chevaux-de-frise, but either of these, while shutting out the cavalry, would also have shut in the guns on that side. The following simple plan was adopted: heaps of kunker (small stones of lime formation used for metalling roads in India) were laid at irregular distances on either side the road. Between these heaps the guns could very easily move out, but they presented a formidable obstacle to a charge of cavalry.
Roopur, Ludwa, &c., whose estates were partly confiscated, and their civil powers greatly reduced, he too was shorn of territory and authority. On the annexation of the Jullundhur Doab by the English in 1846, the Alloowalla Rajah was deprived of all his possessions south of the Sutlej, and only allowed to retain that portion lying along the Beas, of which Kupoorthulla is the capital. Hence the title of Alloowalla, though allowed by courtesy, is almost lost in that of Kupoorthulla. The present Rajah is quite a young man, about six-and-twenty; he succeeded his father about five years ago. He is one of the finest specimens of a native chief. With the manly bearing and address of a Sikh noble he combines a general intelligence far beyond his class, and a deep sympathy with English modes of life and thought. To this combination of interest in the British Government and influence over his own people, we mainly owe the peace of the town and district of Jullundhur. Most warmly does Captain Farrington acknowledge the value of his presence and co-operation in the hour of danger.
It remains to tell how the precautions taken at Jullundhur for the safety of the fort of Phillour were met and seconded by the authorities there. It has been already shown that the safety of this fort was not lost sight of, either in the Lahore or Jullundhur councils. The real importance of Phillour consisted not so much in the vast supplies of munitions of war which it contained, though only a second-class arsenal, but in its commanding position, in a military point of view. Standing on the right bank of the Sutlej, in the direct line of the grand trunk-road, it is the "key of the Punjab." To have lost it at this crisis would have been indeed a heavy blow, and its safety became a paramount object. Its unguarded condition enhanced the danger-not a European ever slept within its walls! When the magazine officer and his subordinates, at the close of their day's work, passed out for their homes in the adjoining cantonment, the fort
was left wholly in the hands of the Sepoy guard, consisting of one company of the N. I. regiment quartered in the cantonments. To occupy it with a European guard was of the first importance. Lieutenant Hildebrand had been despatched from Lahore with a reserve company of artillery; but he was detained at Umritsur to meet the necessities of Govindgurh. In the meanwhile similar provision, though on a much larger scale, was being made at Jullundhur.
The Phillour authorities were in happy ignorance of the impending danger, until the despatch, brought by Mr Brown of the telegraph department, disclosed the critical position of the fort. Colonel Butler, commanding the 3d N. I., took such precautions as he could for the peace of the station, while Lieutenant Griffith, the Commissary of Ordnance, applied himself to secure the fort. The telegraphic wire, which passed at a short distance outside the walls, was brought by connecting-wires into Mr Griffith's private office, and within four hours of Mr Brown's arrival, the whole apparatus was in working order; and the first message from Jullundhur brought the welcome tidings that a strong European force was hastening to their assistance. To keep the fort safe only for that night was now the great object-with the dawn they hoped for succour, with which they could defy three times the number of natives that could attack them. At sunset the fort-gate was closed; all egress peremptorily forbidden, lest the suspicions of the Sepoys in the station should be aroused. A light fieldpiece (6-pounder) was brought down and planted inside the fort so as to command the gateway, loaded with grape, and port-fire burning. Lieutenant Griffith, with the whole of his European subordinates, conductors, and sergeants, only eight in number, stood at it all night, eagerly watching for the arrival of the looked-for succour. Thus passed the anxious hours of that night. The day had not yet dawned when the Europeans arrived; the gate was
quickly opened to welcome them; the mutinous regiments of the Punand to the utter dismay of the Sepoy guard, the European soldiers relieved the sentries, and the fort was safe! Within eight-and-forty hours of that time (as has been since discovered) -on the morning of the 15th of May -the fort was to have been quietly taken possession of by the 3d N. I., and to become the rendezvous for all
Thus did the morning of the 13th of May see the forts of Lahore, Ferozepore, Umritsur, and Phillour, rescued out of the hands of the Poorbeahs! Their mine of treason was not to explode till the 15th; our counter-mine was fired two days before, and the Punjab was saved!
A FAMILIAR EPISTLE FROM MR JOHN COMPANY TO MR JOHN BULL.
MY DEAR JOHN,-You are angry with me--you have said some hard things of me you are preparing to strike me. "Strike; but hear!
There has been a great calamity in India. A terrible misfortune has overtaken us. Yes, John, your sons and brothers, your daughters and your sisters, have been cruelly murdered or foully outraged. Atrocities, which the soul sickens to contemplate, have been perpetrated by my soldiers. I have never spoken lightly of the burden of suffering and sorrow which has descended upon your people. Heaven knows how sorely I have grieved for them. I have seen the black robes and the pale sorrowing faces of wives and mothers mourning for those who are not; and though I cannot bring back the dead, I have tried to comfort the living; and I believe that, at least in some cases, my efforts have not been vain. Say what you like of me, John, but do not say that I have made light of this great trouble. We do not mourn in sackcloth and ashes nowadays. But we go about our work, for work must be done, with heavy hearts; and are not the less stricken because we
do not lift up our voices in loud lamentation after the manner of a Greek chorus.
Yes, John, you may make the most of it-paint it in its blackest colours -proclaim it in the strongest words -no fear that I will gainsay you. No one ought to know, no one does know, so well as I, the full extent of the calamity. "True," you say; "but it is little use to know it now;
LEADENHALL STREET, January 1858.
you ought to have known before that the storm was coming, and you ought to have been prepared to meet it."
Brother, brother! I am afraid that we are neither of us prophets. You must forgive me if I sometimes resort to that vulgar figure of speech known as the "tu quoque." It does not make me really better to prove that you are worse; but poor weak mortals like ourselves, John, are only good or bad by comparison; and as you-just as if your hands were not full enough already-are talking about taking my business out of my hands, and doing it yourself, I may just ask you whether you were prepared for war when you found yourself compelled to put forth all your strength against Nicholas of Russia; whether you had the least expectation a year before that your old and holy ally would behave himself so shamefully towards you? Why, it is not long since you "pampered and petted" the padded Autocrat, and were in ecstasies with his "mild eyes" and his gorgeous race-cups. You "did not think he would ha' done it,” John. I know you did not. Well, there is no harm in confessing that I did not think that my Sepoys would have done it. If I had thought it, you may be sure I should have prepared myself better for the crisis. I repeat that we are neither of us prophets. But if I did not know in 1856 that my Sepoy army would in 1857 be all in a blaze of mutiny, I am certain that they did not know it a jot better themselves. You know the story of the gentleman who
reared and kept a tame tiger. He fed it well with mild diet-with milkand-bread and biscuits, but no flesh he treated it kindly, gave the beast a warm place on his rug, and it licked his hand as a cat would, and was long every bit as gentle. One day, you know, the master had cut his finger, and had put a piece of sticking-plaster over the wound; and when the animal licked his hand as usual, the adhesive plaster was removed, the wound opened, and the beast tasted blood. Forthwith it set up a growl of terrible significance-the savage instincts of the flesh-eater had been suddenly awakened; all past kindness was forgotten; the gentle, tractable, domestic habits of the faithful affectionate companion and servant ceased on the instant with that first taste of blood, and the master soon lay a lifeless and mangled corpse on his own hearth-rug. He never thought the beast would have done it. The beast never thought of doing it. He was a good beast up to the very hour in which he turned round and slew his benefactor. Yes, John; and my Sepoys, though, during the year which has just ended, they have earned for themselves so terrible a notoriety, were really not the traitors and miscreants which you now know them to be, before they had tasted the blood of Adjutant Baugh at Barrackpore. They were wayward and petulant at times like children; but if I had told you a year ago that they were about to rise up and murder their officers, to say nothing of other incredible barbarities, and that therefore it was necessary to send a vast European force to India, to fortify all the large towns, to put a stop to all works of domestic improvement, to send all officers engaged in the great work of administration back to their regiments-in short, if I had prepared myself to stand a siege from my own native army, it is easy to guess, John, that you would have called me a timid old fool, and asked why I was making so much stir about nothing. Nay, if when, for your own purposes, you weakened my European force, sending to me to bring regiments from India for your Russian war, on the plea that I did not want them, I had protested
against your selfishness, and declared that I could not trust my native army, you would have jeered at my weak nerves, at my hypochondriac fears, and declared that there was no danger, except in my own diseased imagination. Nay, John, you would have told me (for you wanted your own soldiers then) that if I could not defend the country with my Sepoys, it had better be abandoned altogether, for that you could never divert the strength of your army from its proper uses-the defence of Great Britain, and the maintenance of her position in Europe. It always has been so. You have lent me your troops freely, when I have not wanted them any more than yourself, and you have taken them away from me when you have wanted them, without caring what I might suffer by their loss. This is your custom, John. Now, I say, is it fair is it honest, to ask why, when my Sepoys first set up their tiger-cry, and sprang upon their officers, I had not a large body of your troops at my disposal_to_crush the mutiny in the bud? If I was weak at that time in European troops, brother, who made me so, I should like to know?
Then you ask me why I had not posted the Europeans at my disposal in their proper places? You know the story, John, of your brother Paddy's blanket-how that the said blanket, being too small to cover him from shoulder to heel, he cut a piece off the top, and sewed it on to the bottom when his feet were cold; and when the draft came to his back, he reversed the process, but did not mend matters, you may be sure. Now, I might have cut a piece off the top, and sewed it on to the bottom, but the blanket would not have covered me from Peshawur to Pegu any better for this process. Still, it must be admitted that you hit a blot, when you ask why there were no European troops in Delhi, which contained our principal arsenals and magazines. Well, John, I must make a clean breast of it, and admit that there ought to have been European troops in Delhi, and that I ought to have insisted on having competent soldiers at the head of my armies, to see that the troops were properly distributed.