ment, only accommodated to the meanest capacity. And how edifying and convincing the conclusion-with reverence we would speak it-there is a somewhere; ergo, there is a God! Yet, we see no real difference between this statement, and that of our Author respecting Space.

But every one immediately perceives, that Somewhere is an abstract idea, implying real existence under unknown circumstances or conditions. And what is Space but an abstract idea, related in like manner to real existence under the notion of immensity? Mr. Drew says, that the reverse of Space is no-space, which is a pure negation, and that, therefore, Space must be a positive entity. We deny the major proposition; for we say, that the reverse of space is place, as the reverse of what is limited is illimitable. Space is an indefinite idea by which we imply illimitable existence. The fact is, that we cannot form the idea of existence at all, without that of time, and that of place, entering into the complex notion. The ideas of time and of place are simple abstract ideas, incapable alike of definition or further analysis; but they are related to existence as necessary conditions or attributes. We learn to measure time and place by experience, but the ideas themselves, if not innate, must be termed necessary ideas, since they are awakened by the first act of reflection, and are inseparable from the conscious notion of existence. Now, what time and place are to finite existence, that immensity and eternity are to infinite existence. And precisely in the same manner as we ar rive at the idea of infinite, unoriginated Existence, do we arrive at the ideas of boundless duration and immensity, as the conditions of such Existence, or rather, as component parts of the idea of Infinite Existence. Thus Dr. Clarke remarks, in his Fourth Reply to Leibnitz, (§ 10.) that space and duration are not hors de Dieu, but are caused by, and are immediate ' and necessary consequences of his existence; and without them, his eternity and ubiquity would be taken away.' He had before remarked, (Third Reply, § 3.) that Space is not a 'being, but a property or a consequence of the existence of a Being infinite and eternal: infinite space is immensity." Space and time,' he remarks, are quantities.' It is true that afterwards, in his Fifth Reply, he seems to abandon his simple, intelligible proposition, advanced in his "Demonstration," namely, that Space is nothing but the abstract idea of innensity; maintaining, (p. 303. note,) that it is not a mere idea,' because no idea of Space can possibly be framed larger than finite; and yet, reason demonstrates that it is a 'contradiction for Space itself not to be actually infinite.' But by this he can only mean, that it has an existence inde

pendent of our ideas, seeing that it transcends them, and is not a thing of which we can conceive, but one which reason ascertains to be necessary. For he is, in this very note, distinguishing between abstract and concrete ideas, in order to shew that space, or immensity, is an abstract idea, a property, in opposition to a substance. It is not a mere idea, just as existence is not a mere idea; that is, there is really such a thing as existence, and space is related to what really exists. In this sense, no real property is a mere idea, any more than a real substance is. Yet, who will deny that existence, life, immensity, duration, are abstract ideas,-as much so as figure, extension, colour, power, goodness? That space is an abstract idea, is necessarily implied, when it is admitted to be but a property, a quantity, related to existence*.

But now to apply this to the great argument. Mr. Drew, having, as he imagines, demonstrated Space to be an infinite perfection, argues, that, as a finite perfection cannot exist without a finite substance,' so, an infinite perfection cannot exist without an infinite substance.' Which is something very much like a truism. But what would be thought of this mode of proof applied to finite substance? There is such a thing as time and place; therefore I cannot but really exist' or, there is limited space above and around us; therefore, there cannot but be finite existences to which the pro'perty of existing in such limited space must attach.' Who does not see that the first of these positions would be absurd, the second, inconsequential? The idea of existence includes time and space as essential properties of the substance that exists; and the notion of an infinite Substance is antecedent to that of an infinite perfection. Instead of the Divine existence being inferrible from the existence of Space, Space itself is but an immediate and necessary consequence of the existence of God.

Our limits will not admit of following the Author through his argument founded on the nature of Duration, which comprises little more than a varied application of the same mode

That Space is not any kind of substance is no less plain. Because infinite Space is immensitas, not immensum; whereas infinite Substance is immensum, not immensitas. Just as Duration is not a substance: because infinite Duration is æternitas, not æternum; but infinite Substance is æternum, not æternitas. It remains, therefore, by necessary consequence, that Space is a property, in like manner as Duration is. Immensitas is Tou Immensi; just as Eternitas is TOU Eterni.'

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of reasoning. Duration being a perfection, and infinite duration an infinite perfection, it must, he contends, inhere in some Infinite and Eternal Substance; therefore, there is a God. If P there is a single human being whose faith in the Divine Existence can be strengthened by such a process of inverted argumentation, we would not rob him of the benefit. But he must have a mind singularly constituted-he must be at once a sorry reasoner and a good metaphysician, no impossible compound.

Mr. Drew now proceeds to take a different ground, in which he shews the same logical acuteness and dexterity, but still, in our opinion, fails to display the character of a correct and sober reasoner. The position laid down in Chapter IV., is, that Eternal Existence being possible, an Eternal Being must be 'possible; and if an Eternal Being be possible, he must really exist.' The whole chapter is very much like a continued quibble or play upon words; and we must say with Howe, that such reasoning looks like trifling. The very first sentence is unhappy: We know that actual existence is possible.' Strictly speaking, what actually exists is no longer in a state to which possibility attaches. But,' says Mr. Drew, few things can be more absurd than to suppose, that the actual 'existence of any being could destroy the simple possibility of it; for, if this were granted, it would follow, that a being actually existing could have no possibility of existence,-which is a plain contradiction.' The actual existence of a being cannot destroy the possibility of its existence, because proves it to have been antecedently possible that it should exist; and it proves its continued existence to be possible. But what is actual, loses its character of possible the moment it is known to exist, because certainty includes possibility, and possibility merges in the ascertained certainty. Possibility implies an alternative: what is possible, may be non-existent, which cannot apply to actual existence when ascertained to exist. Thus, it does not class with possibles, that a man who is to-day known to be alive, was alive yesterday; it is certain; there is no room for a contrary supposition. Probability is a degree of knowledge intermediate between possibility and certainty. Actual existence, if it can be said to be possible, may as well be affirmed to be probable. What, then, should we think of a person who should say, I see you are alive, therefore your actual existence is probable? But Mr. Drew may say, that actual existence is simply possible, when we have no certain knowledge of its actually existing. This, however, would be but taking advantage of the twofold sense in which the word possibility is used; and it is this, we think, which has

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misled him. A thing is philosophically possible when the supposition of its existence implies no contradiction,-possible as opposed to an absurdity ; but it is morally possible, as opposed to certainty, only in the absence of that higher degree of evidence which should prove or disprove its actual existence. In this latter sense, possibility is equivalent to the lowest degree of certainty,—that is, to the veriest uncertainty; while, in the former sense, it expresses an abstract certainty,--a philosophical truth. The actual existence of inhabitants in the moon is philosophically possible, because the supposition implies no absurdity; it is also morally possible, and can be no more than possible to us, in the absence of all ground of certainty, the fact being unknown. But my actual existence at this moment or at any past moment of my life, is neither a philosophical nor a moral possibility, but a physical certainty, the contrary involving an absurdity; and it is an abuse of words to speak of such a fact as possible.

But let us see what use Mr. Drew has made of his argument in application to the Divine Existence.

"To admit the existence of this (Eternal) Being to be possible without being real, is to admit a principle which is inconsistent with itself; since, unless he has actually existed from eternity, his want of actual existence, in any given period, will render the possibility of his eternal existence absolutely impossible.' Vol. i. p. 113.

Such a demonstration as this might puzzle an atheist, if such a being exists, but could it convince him? He would admit at once, not merely the possibility, but the reality of some Eternal substance; and to attempt to demonstrate this, is, therefore, wholly impertinent. But, as to the atheistic question of possibility in reference to the Divine Being, it is a possibility opposed, not to impossibility, but only to certainty. The atheist does not allege that it is impossible, but he affects to doubt the fact for want of sufficient evidence; and in doubt

e ing the fact of the actual existence of a God, he of course doubts the actual, though not the 'abstract possibility of his Eternal existence. Mr. Drew's argument, stated syllogistically, runs thus : * It is possible there is a God; but it is not possible, unless he has always existed; therefore, he has always existed. The conclusion is a fallacy: the correct inference would be. Therefore, if there is a God, he must always have existed; which the atheist would not deny. The other is a sophism . But we object to the major proposition, it is possible, &c.; because the expression implies that it is not certain, that the contrary is not impossible; whereas it is infinitely certain that God is.

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The remaining chapters of this first part are occupied with demonstrating, That some Being that is uncaused, necessarily existent, independent, must have existed from all eternity; that such a Being must possess active energy, and must possess all natural perfections in an absolute manner; and that no more than one necessarily existent Being or Essence is possible. Here there is less room for originality, and less temptation to be paradoxical. The first part of the argument is substantially that of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Bishop Hamilton; but Mr. Drew delights in exhibiting it under a variety of logical forms, as if he could never satiate his mind with the metaphysical beauty of the demonstration. In attempting to prove that no more than One necessarily existent being or essence can be possible, he ventures, however, on a mode of reasoning which is very inadequately guarded by a feeble saving-clause, from leading to conclusions subversive of the Christian faith. The chapter embraces five propositions: 1. No more than one • Being or Essence is required to be necessarily existent. 2. The manner in which a necessarily existent Being or Essence exists, precludes all plurality. 3. Two necessarily existent Beings or Essences can neither operate alike, nor differently from each other, either by natural necessity or mutual agreement. 4. Two necessarily existent. Beings or Essences can'not be different from each other; nor can they be alike without being the same. 5, Variety in perfections is perfectly ⚫ consistent with unity of essence and of being.' These are bold and in our judgement unauthorized positions; but, previously to examining them, we shall transcribe the savingclause alluded to. He has been shewing, that, if two necessarily existent Beings or Essences exist, their perfections cannot be specifically different: they must, then, be radically the same.' He proceeds:

Then these Beings or Essences must be radically the same also; because the sameness of their perfections will prevent them from in: cluding any quality, property, or attribute that may not invariably be predicated af simple unity. Hence, no division,-no alteration,na change, no diversity, can, under these circumstances, affect a unity for essence, even though it were possessed by distinct personalities. The possibility of distinct personalities possessing the same essence, may be inferred from the doctrine which the Gospel inculgates, of a TRINITY in UNITY. Still, there can be but one essence; and, consequently, but one omnipotence, and but one omniscience, although possessed by three distinct persons,'

If, as we imagine, Mr. Drew is a believer in the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, we must say that such language as this

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