fider it without a fenfible pleasure. It may SER M. X. therefore juftly be feared, that as fome men's habitual impreffions of God, (particularly in their devotion,) have more of a joyless awe, and servile dread, than a delightful complacency, this proceeds from their misrepresenting him to themselves, as a being who acts towards his creatures merely in the way of arbitrary dominion, appointing them to happiness or mifery only because he will. Whereas the true notion of infinite goodness, directed in its exercise by the most perfect wisdom, and having always for its object the greatest and most extenfive happiness, would inspire the mind with sentiments of ingenuous gratitude, and thereby be the best security of our fincere obedience. At the fame time, there is no reason to allege that the tendency of this is to encourage a presumptuous confidence in finners, as imagining they may go on fecurely in their trefpaffes with hopes of impunity; (which can only proceed from a wretched depravity of heart, and a wrong notion of the divine goodness, as if it were a blind undistinguishing proneness to the communication of happiness;) for befides that every confiderate person must see that fupreme goodness itself has established an inviolable connexion between virtue and felicity, the true fenfe of that glo

SER M.rious and amiable perfection, even naturally X. and immediately begets an inward shame and

remorse for having dishonoured it, and some degree of hope is abfolutely necessary to repentance.

But let us confider ourselves as the particular objects of the divine favour,-That whatever good we poffefs of any kind, whatever excellence we are confcious of in the frame of our nature, and its pre-eminence above other kinds of creatures in the world about us,That largeness of understanding whereby we are entertained with an infinite diversity of objects,-Thofe natural affections which yield us a great variety of pleasure,-our moral сараcities and improvements which are accompanied with a high sense of worth, The privileges of our condition, That provifion which is made for our eafy enjoyment of life, whether by the means of our own invention and induftry, and the affistance of our fellow creatures or without them,-and The greater happiness we hope for hereafter,-All these and all other good things, however convey'd, are originally owing to the bounty of God. Now the affection of gratitude is fo natural to the mind of man, that we fhall fcarcely allow him to be reckoned one of the fpecies who is altogether void of it; at least, to be ungrate

ful

ful is univerfally accounted one of the moft SER M. abandoned and profligate characters. But X. furely this principle ought to operate moft vigorously towards the greatest beneficence; and there is none that may be compared with that which God has fhewn to us. Shall we be much affected with the kindnefs of our fellow creatures, and disposed to make thankful acknowledgments for their favours? And shall we be infenfible of that goodness to which we owe our being and our very capacity of happiness, as well as the materials of it? This is the noblest object of human affection, in which the mind, firmly perfuaded and steddily contemplating it, refts fully fatisfied. And though the exercise and manifestation of this divine principle towards ourfelves, gives us the most convincing proof of it, and a very lively sense of its amiable excellence, yet does not the affection ultimately terminate in our own happiness, so that we should be justly said to love God for our own fakes, but in fupreme Goodness itself, which must appear the most complete and worthy object of love to every intelligent and moral being whofe judgment is not misled by prejudices or inattention, and which is not deeply corrupted in its moral affections.

Thirdly,

X.

SERM. Thirdly, we may confider the intire moral character of the Deity. All his moral attributes may be fummed up in goodness, which is probably the justest way we can conceive of them as active principles in him. Perhaps in inferior characters benevolence may be rightly called the fum of virtue; but of the fupreme independent Being we cannot think more becomingly than that this folely is this fpring of his actions. Yet confidering the variety of its exercise according to the different condition of rational creatures, and how varioufly individuals are affected with those very measures which they fteddily purfue as their great end (the universal good,) hence arises a diverfity in our conceptions concerning that most fimple uniform principle which is without variableness or fhadow of turning. We know how to distinguish in imperfect human characters between the righteous and the good: The laft is the finishing quality, yet others are neceffary: And applying this to God, we have fomewhat different notions of his goodness abstractly confidered, and of the rectitude or holiness of his nature, his juftice, and his truth; all which in conjunction with unchangeable goodness make up his true moral character, and are the intire object of our affection.

Now,

Now, let any man calmly confider how SERM. his mind is affected towards these qualities in X. a limited degree of perfection. Let him try what a difference his heart naturally makes between the generous patriot, the faithful friend, the inflexibly righteous judge, the kind benefactor, and the directly oppofite characters as they are reprefented in history. Whether the one does not neceffarily attract his veneration and esteem, and the other beget his contempt and averfion, tho' they are fuppofed to be at the remotest distance from his perfonal knowledge, and without a poffibility of having any effect on his own interest. Let him place these contrary objects in a nearer point of view, applying the characters fo far as they may be justly applied within his particular acquaintance; (for the condition of the world is not at any time either fo good or fo bad, but that this distinction is manifeft;) ftill it will evidently appear that the righteous is more excellent than his neighbour; and that unblemished integrity, with all the public and private virtues, command a peculiar refpect, fhining through all the obscurity which superstition and a party spirit have been able to throw upon them, and still as the moral character rises in perfection, our esteem for it proportionably increases.

But