importance of this faculty for the taste than Erdmann's theory admits, though of course it does not follow that the doctrine of the Judgment was fully developed at the time of the projected Critique of Taste. In fact this is, as Erdmann argues, quite improbable,1 but it does not at all follow from this that the first projected work contained any criticism of the teleological judgments. It is more natural to suppose that it was what he called it-a Critique of Taste. The problem which confronted him here was, How can there be any a priori element in taste inasmuch as taste is an expression of the feelings? We have seen that in the early attempts to answer this problem a line of approach was found through a comparison with the feelings arising from the furtherance of the life of the senses, and of the special furtherance of the life of the powers of understanding. This last is brought out more fully in the introduction to the Critique of Judgment. We know that we experience pleasure in a scientific discovery which explains an aggregate of seemingly heterogenous laws through some simple principle which introduces unity into the whole. But this means that it gives us pleasure to find nature conforming to the unity which is an Idea of reason.3 Is it not the case with our feelings of pleasure in the beautiful that they also are connected with a conformity of objects to our faculties? Though as the question is here not of the harmonizing of experi ence as a whole, but of perceiving beautiful objects, it may be expected to be a harmony between the faculties of imagination and understanding. But how explain the claim for universality made by the judgments of taste, since these are not subsumed under any general concept? Another fragment states as an answer to the problem, that such a judgment must have a principle of the use of the intellectual faculties which is based on some supersensuous determination of them, whether this determination is

4

5

For this reason, as well as because the Critique of Taste, as first projected, did not in my opinion treat the teleological judgments, I cannot agree with Fischer's conjecture (Gesch. d. n. Philos. III., Auflage, Bd. IV. 413) that the Introduction sent to Beck was the original introduction to this first projected work.

2 This is apparently the view of Caird, II. 408 f, 513. H. V. 193 f; Kr. d. Urtheilskraft, orig. edition, XL. f.

4H. V. 196; U. XLV.

5"Lose Blätter," D. 22, I. p. 254.

merely assumed or is well grounded. This is a somewhat vague statement of formal purposiveness. It was perhaps here that the categories again furnished a clue, as indicated in the statement to Reinhold that the analysis of the faculties of Intellect and Will had given the key to the solution of the problem of Taste. If we may trust the presentation in the Introduction as corresponding with the original discovery, it was the analogy of the singular empirical judgment which suggested the systematic form of the answer. Any one making a singular empirical judgment expects that every one else will agree, because he pronounces this judgment according to the universal rules of the determining judgment under the laws of a possible experience. "Even so he who feels pleasure in the reflection over the form of an object, with no reference to any concept, makes a just claim that every one agree with him in approval, because the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal though subjective condition of judgments of reflection, namely in the purposive agreement of an object, be it product of nature or of art, with the relation of the faculties of knowledge. This purposive agreement is not perceived, but it is felt, and hence in the feeling of the beautiful we may be said to have a subjective teleology. It does not enable me to say "Nature is purposive," but only "Nature awakens in me the harmonious play of my faculties and I then feel the purposiveness.

3. So much was more or less definitely in Kant's mind in 1787. In examining what further development took place to make the Critique of Taste a Critique of Judgment we are led to notice an article which he wrote near the close of this same year. It is not certain that this article had any influence on his more important work, but as it marks a step in the progress which his teleology was making it is not improbable that it suggested to him the desirability of giving a fuller treatment to the general subject of all teleological judgments. The article referred to was written under the title Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie, and was called out by the criticism of Forster upon the use of teleological principles in Kant's former articles. Kant in reply after reiterating the necessity of a guid

1H. V. 197 f; U. XLVI. f.

ing principle for scientific observation, and defending his positions on the distinction between a Natural History and a Description of Nature, is brought to discuss the general principle of teleology in its application to natural science more fully than he had done hitherto. Agreeing perfectly with the demand that every thing in natural science must be explained naturally, he points out that this very principle implies its own limitation in that it requires that we use only such grounds of explanation as can be verified by experience. This limitation is disregarded if we assume forces the existence of which cannot be proved and can scarcely be reconciled with reason. The problem is to explain the origin and development of an organism. The very concept of an. organized being however involves that it is a structure in which all parts stand in reciprocal relations of means and ends, and any force assumed to explain an organism must be thought as a cause working according to ends. But forces of this sort are known to us in our experience as regards their determining grounds (or "from the inside," Bestimmungs grunde) only in ourselves. It follows then that for the human reason at least, the only possible way of conceiving such a structure is to conceive it as a system of final causes, and the only possible mode of explanation is the teleological. In other words, the question of the origin of organization is one that transcends physics and can be answered, if at all, only by metaphysic. The difference between Forster and Kant is that the former invents a special force which acts purposively without any end or design, either in itself or in its cause. Kant prefers to limit himself to forces actually given in experience. We have no insight which enables us to say that the production of such an effect by any other cause is impossible, but we must either renounce all attempt at determining the cause, or think an intelligent being as the author. 1

1H. IV. 490-494. The remark on p. 492, with regard to the thought of a continuous chain of organized beings, connected, not simply in their resemblances, but through actual kinship, brought forth by the fruitful earth-that this is a fancy with which many have amused themselves, but have afterwards given it up, because nothing could be gained from it— is interesting in the light of the Reflexions, 1742–44, and Met. 98 f, as it doubtless refers to Kant himself, and indicates that the distinction between organized and unorganized matter, now seemed to him a wider one than formerly. But see, for his latest view, H. V. 431 f; U. 368 f.

2

4. Here then was a necessity for supplementing the negative statements of the Critique of Pure Reason that physico-mechanical explanation should be pushed as far as possible, with the limitation that it could not explain for our reason organic life, and it may well have been the reflection on this point which led Kant to supplement the subjective purposiveness of the Critique of Taste with the objective purposiveness of the teleological judgments in the narrower sense of the word. This as well as the study of the æsthetic judgments may then well have occasioned the fuller examination of the faculty of Judgment and the line of thought followed in the general introduction of the Critique of Judgment. For, as pointed out by Stadler,' the discussion in this introduction of the teleological presuppositions in science, together with the Critique of the Teleological Judgment undertakes the task suggested in the Prolegomena, viz., "of tracing the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysic into the general principles of systematizing a history of nature." The elements of this discussion, so far as it concerns the purposiveness of nature, are all found in the Critique of Pure Reason, but the emphasis is dif ferently placed. In both Critiques the a priori origin of the three maxims of reason is maintained, but in the first we were assured that no deduction of them was possible; here a deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature which expresses itself in the three maxims is given, but we find that it is only a deduction of its necessity for the use of the reflective judgment, and so is not a transcendental deduction in the same sense as the deduction of the categories. Purposiveness, like the Ideas, remains a subjective principle, a maxim. In both Critiques the applicability of the logical apparatus of the mind to the comprehension of nature is examined; but in the first we are warned that to say "whether the constitution of objects or the nature of the understanding which knows them as objects, were in themselves determined for systematic unity. (and whether we could say that all knowledge of the understanding has the unity of rea

'Kant's Teleologie, p. 46.

2 H. IV. 112.

5

3 For the parallelism, see Stadler, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.

4A. 664; B. 691 f.

H. V. 189 f; U. XXXI.-XXXIV.

son) would be a transcendental principle of reason, which would make the systematic unity of reason not merely subjectively and logically necessary as a method but also objectively necessary.1 In the Critique of Judgment the fact is emphasized that it is only as we do assume such a determination of nature, and regard its laws as if an understanding had given them in behalf of our faculty of knowledge, that we can legitimately apply our logical method. The first Critique warns against assuming the reality of the principle of systematic unity at the beginning, and, by using it to explain all the unity in nature surrendering the unity in nature as being quite foreign to the nature of things, purely contingent. The last Critique maintains that aside from the necessary connection of objects in time through general laws of experience, objects may be connected in an infinite number of ways, at least so far as we can judge a priori. We are then obliged

2

3

to judge that so far as we can see, the unity of nature, according to empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience are contingent. In short, the first Critique on this point warns science against the dogmatic metaphysicians and the perversion of the principles offered by the reason for the regulation of the understanding. The last Critique reminds science of the presuppositions involved in its whole procedure.

5. Before leaving the "formal purposiveness" of the introduction and the æsthetic judgments for the teleological judgments in the narrower sense, it will be of interest to notice the changed interpretation put by Kant on Leibniz and his pre-established harmony. As already noticed, at some time in his development Kant seems to have recognized this theory as a legitimate, in fact the only legitimate formulation of the doctrine which in some form was always prominent in his thought. But with the advent of critical rationalism the harmonia praestabilitata with its influxus idealis was abandoned for the harmonia stabilitata, and this for the category of reciprocity with its accompanying criticism of Leibniz in the Appendix on the Amphiboly. In 1790, however, in the criticism of Eberhard, we find an altogether different interpretation of Leibniz designed to defend him from his self styled fol

1A. 648; B. 676.

2 A. 692 f; B. 720 ff.

3 H. V. 189; U. XXXII f.

Jor M