such motive, since it is impossible to suppose, that to be malevolent is a more desirable state of being, than to be benevolent. And no such motive can be presented to God from without himself, since all other beings, together with all that pertains to them, being what he, antecedently to their existence, chose either to produce or to permit, it is certain that he could gain nothing to himself by the exercise of malevolence. Therefore, if malevolent, he must sustain that character without a motive.

The second argument is, that, inasmuch as an Omniscient Being cannot but see, that to sustain and exhibit a benevolent character is more glorious to himself and more beneficial to his creatures, than the contrary, and as the glory of the Creator and the good of his creatures involve every thing that is desirable,—an infinite motive is constantly presented to the Creator, to the exercise of benevolence; that the exercise of malevolence would, therefore, be not only without a motive, but against the influence of the strongest possible motive to the contrary, and could arise only from an original inherent propensity in the Infinite Nature, a propensity uninfluenced by truth, and immoveable by motives.'

Thirdly. The only conduct which a Creator can receive with pleasure from his creatures, must plainly be, attachment, reverence, and the voluntary obedience which they produce;' and 'it is impossible that God should not choose to be loved, reverenced, and obeyed.' But the Creator has so formed his works, and so constituted his providence, that the minds of men irresistibly, and of absolute necessity, esteem a benevolent being, and hate and despise malevolence, To suppose the Creator to be a malevolent being, therefore, would be, to believe, that he has necessitated, beyond a possibility of its being otherwise, his intelligent creatures to hate and despise that which he supremely loves and approves, viz. his own moral character,' and to esteem and love the opposite.

Fourthly. The Creator has placed mankind either in a state of trial, or a state of reward: but our present state is, on neither of these suppositions, compatible with the doctrine that he is malevolent.' Rational creatures can exist in no possible situation except one of these two. If, then, we are placed in a state of reward, we are beyond measure more happy, and less miserable, than is consistent with the character of malevolence in the Creator.' If in a state of trial, our circumstances are equally at variance with the supposition, all our opposition to such a character being necessarily approved by our own consciences. And God has so constituted the world, as to make misery the only legitimate and natural consequence of malevolence, and happiness the only natural consequence of benevolence."

Lastly. The goodness of God displayed in the present world, is a strong argument that he is a benevolent Being.' This is ilIustrated by the following considerations pursued into detail. The

last is urged in a very forcible manner as a proof of the forbearance of God.

1. God makes mankind the subjects of extensive enjoyment in the present world. 2. God has furnished mankind with many alleviations and many remedies for the evils which they suffer in the present world. 3. The original and main design of each particular thing, appears plainly [as insisted upon by Dr. Paley] to be benevolent. 4. All the blessings experienced by mankind are bestowed on sinful beings.'

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Dr. Dwight then notices the objections usually made against this doctrine as a dictate of reason, which are reducible to two: the existence of moral evil, and the existence of natural (or, more properly, physical,) evil. Here he frankly avows himself to be unable, and expresses his complete conviction that all other men are unable, to explain this subject so as to give an inquirer clear and satisfactory views, by the light of reason, of the propriety of permitting the introduction of moral evil into the Intelligent System.' He contents himself with insisting on the following positions: 1. God cannot be proved to be the efficient cause of sin;' and till this is done, man is unquestionably to be acknowledged as the cause of his own sin. 2. It cannot be proved, that God was obliged, either by justice or benevolence, to prevent sin from existing;' inasmuch as a state of trial supposes a liability to sin, and it cannot be proved, that it is inconsistent with justice or benevolence, for God to place his rational creatures in a state of trial. S. It cannot be proved, that the existence of sin will, in the end, be a detriment to the Universe.' The objection drawn from the existence of physical evil might seem scarcely deserving of separate discussion, physical evil being but the consequence of moral evil. The considerations urged by Dr. Dwight, that, of a large proportion of such evils, men are themselves the authors, that the evils inflicted by God are always less than the subjects of them merit, and that afflictions have often a beneficial influence,-do not appear to us to be urged with his usual acuteness, since they leave the previous difficulty undiminished. The case of infants, he evades, rather than fairly disposes of. In fact the existence of physical evil, viewed apart from that of moral evil, is wholly inexplicable. An infidel can give no answer to the question-how death originated; the only solution is that of the Apostle-" By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." Rejecting this, or attempting to go beyond this, we are lost in interminable conjectures. Although afflictions have unquestionably a beneficial effect on the minds of many individuals, it is equally certain, that their effect on others is of a prejudicial kind. That they are overruled as means of good, may be admitted to supply a striking proof of the benevolence of the Supreme Moral Governor in his providential dispensations; but, unless the necessary tendency of pain and suffering were beneficial, which assuredly it is

not, the existence of physical evil is by no means accounted for. The only conclusion on which we can repose as a dictate of reason, is that at which Leibnitz arrives in his Essay on the Goodness of God. Infinite Goodness united to Supreme Wisdom, could not but choose, out of all possible things, that which is best. An objector may reply, that the world might have existed without sin and without suffering; but I deny that it would therefore have been better. Every thing,' he adds, having been foreseen by God, has contributed as it were ideally (idealment), before its actual existence, to the determination formed in the Divine mind respecting the existence of all things. If, therefore, the smallest evil which arises in the world, were not to take place, it would no longer be that world which, all things being taken into the account, has been deemed the best by the Creator who has made choice of it.' I may not be able to show you in detail how any other conceivable worlds would be inferior to that in which we exist; for can I comprehend, or can I represent to others, infinite things, and compare them one with another? But you ought to conclude with me that it must be so, ab effectu, since God has chosen the world such as it is.'*

Dr. Dwight admits, in concluding the discourse, that the arguments he has adduced, scarcely amount to a demonstration in the strict logical sense, but they furnish the most solid foundation for rational and immoveable confidence. He adds very forcibly:

Intuitive or demonstrative certainty concerning the moral character of God, might exist in every supposable case, without any useful influence on the heart or on the life. Nor would he who, in the possession of high probable evidence that God is a benevolent being, have demanded a demonstration of this truth before he would yield his heart to his Maker, be at all more inclined to yield it, when he arrived at the demonstration. Confidence, on the contrary, is always a virtuous state of mind, being invariably a cordial assent to that truth which is its object. Confidence in the moral character of God is a virtuous emotion, capable of reaching to any degree of excellence predicable of rational creatures, and being founded on evidence which, like a converging series, will rise higher and higher for ever, it will increase eternally in strength and excellency; and will more and more intimately, in an unceasing progress, unite the hearts of all moral beings to their glorious and perfect Creator.'

The proof of the doctrine from Revelation is very strikingly enlarged upon in the subsequent discourse. Among other arguments, what amounts almost to demonstrative evidence, presents itself in the considerations, that, in the law which God has given to mankind for the regulation of all their moral conduct, He has required no other obedience than their love to himself and to each

*«Theodicée." 12mo. Tom. i. pp. 84.-6.

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other; and, that God requires the whole regard which he claims to be rendered to him, only as a benevolent God. One of the inferences drawn from the whole argument, is this; that the perfect benevolence of God must delight in greater good more than in that which is less, and most in that which is supreme." present system, therefore, it is argued, in accordance with the sentiment quoted from Leibnitz, must be the best and most perfect system of good; and the means employed for the accomplishment of God's final end, must also be the best and most proper that could be chosen. The whole work of creation and providence, composed of the means and the end, is, then, a perfect work entirely suited to his character."

In the fifteenth sermon, on the Decrees of God, in which the reader will find some very able reasoning, the same sentiment is thus expressed.

It cannot but be acknowledged, that He knew what system was, upon the whole, most desirable, wisest and best. If he did not resolve on it, it was plainly because he did not desire or choose to bring it to pass. In plain English, then, he did not desire the chief good of his creation, or the supreme glory of himself, with sufficient good-will to resolve on it. Can this be infinite goodness? Can it be moral perfection? If he did not resolve on the superior system, it must be that he chose to do less good, rather than greater.'

In this sermon, we meet with one of the very rare instances which the work contains of Americanisms.

The metaphysical nature of Moral Agency both in God and his creatures, is a subject, perhaps, as tenuious, as difficult to be fastened upon, and as easily evanescent from the mind, as any which we can attempt to examine.'

In the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sermons, on the probation and fall of man, this vast, and fathomless, and ever recurring question, Si Deus est, unde malum? again presents itself; and our Author's views of the metaphysical difficulties of the subject, are still further developed. After enlarging on the character of the Tempter, and the subtlety which distinguished the manner of the temptation, he remarks that the character of the persons was probably singular.

They were newly created; were innocent; were holy; and, considering the short period of their being, were undoubtedly possessed of no small discernment in divine things. Still, they were imperfect beings, without experience, and destitute of knowledge in many particulars which would naturally be wished in a case where art and falsehood were employed against them; and, although furnished with a clear comprehension of their own duty, were totally ignorant of the character, and unable readily to conjecture the designs of their adversary. The first deceit which

they ever knew, was now practised on themselves; and the first falsehood of which they ever heard, was now directed to their own destruction. Of the rebellion of the Angels, they probably knew nothing; of the character of the Tempter, they would not naturally form even a suspicion. Accustomed to hear only truth, they would not easily expect a lie; and, habituated only to faithfulness and friendship, fraud and malevolence were, in their approach to them, assured of a necessary and sufficient disguise. That artless, childlike simplicity which so delights the mind, and embellishes the pictures of the historian and the poet, which adorned the life, and endeared and enforced the lessons of the Redeemer himself, and which now constitutes no small part of evangelical excellence, was then a principal trait in their character. In the peculiar kind of wisdom which we call prudence, they certainly had made little progress; and caution must have been known to them only in lessons of instruction.

Thus they were, in several important respects, beings fitted for imposition, and not unnaturally the victims of insidiousness and cunning. The same means, at the present time, ensnare persons of the same character; and it is not in the nature of things, that superior sagacity, however employed, should not possess the power of influencing, more or less, the same simplicity. Firm obedience, such as they were bound to render to their God, a prompt undeliberating refusal, and an original steadfast determination not to listen, would have secured them from yielding; but when they began to hear, and to investigate, they began to be exposed; and their danger increased with every step of their progress in inquiry.

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In the meantime, it seems that neither of them thought of supplicating the aid of their Creator. A single prayer would have put the Tempter to flight, and dissolved the charm of the temptation. A single recollection, also, of his commands, his kindnesses, and his instructions, might easily have produced the same effect. But neither prayer nor recollection was summoned to their assistance. Like their descendants, when forgetful of God, and, in a sense, forgotten by him, they were weak, frail and exposed to every danger.'

The Author then briefly adverts to the immediate consequences of the temptation, and passes on to a consideration of the two great questions' so perpetually iterated: Since our first parents were entirely holy, how could they become sinful?' and, Why did God permit Adam to fall?'

The first question, he remarks, in its simple and proper form, is no other than this: How can a holy being become sinful, or how can a holy being transgress the law of God?' To this, no philosophical answer can, he thinks, be given. It has, however, been unnecessarily embarrassed by the modes in which answers to it have been attempted. To refer the effect, in the case of Adam,