THE SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S TELEOLOGY. INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION ZUR ERLANGUNG DER DOCTORWÜRDE VORGELEGT DER HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FACULTÄT DER ALBERT-LUDWIGS-UNIVERSITÄT ZU CONTENTS. I. TELEOLOGY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY BEFORE KANT I. Descartes. 2. Gassendi. 3. English investigators, par- ticularly Boyle and 4, Newton. 5. Leibniz in his relation to Cartesianism and Spinoza. 6. The general system, and 7, the special aspects of the teleology of Leibniz. 8. Wolffian modifications of the teleology of Leibniz. 9. Reimarus. 10. 1. Teleology in the fragment on Optimism. 2. Development in the General History and Theory of the Heavens. 3. Comparison of Kant's early views with those of Leibniz. 4. Teleology in the Sole Proof. Moral and non-moral depend- ence. 5. Treatment of organic life as compared with the 1. The aspects of formal purposiveness, (a) Unity of Nature, (b) Relation of the mind to its object. (c) The regulative principles of science, homogeneousness, continuity and specification. 2. Treatment of Organic Life in this period. 3. Physico-theology in the Meta- physik. 4. Moral theology in the Metaphysik. 5. Physico-and moral theology in the Critique of Pure IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEOLOGY AFTER 1781 1. Idea for a Universal History. 2. Development of formal purposiveness in the projected Critique of Taste up to 1788. 3. Teleology in the article On the Use of Teleological Princi- ples in Nature. 4. The general point of view of the Critique of Judgment. 5. Changed interpretation of Leibniz's pre- established harmony. 6. Objective teleology in organized beings. 7. Physical and moral teleology in their relations to In addition to the obligations indicated in the notes I wish to express my special indebtedness to the works of Riehl, Caird, Stadler and B. Erdmann, and to the personal help of Professors Garman, Ladd, and Riehl, with whom I have studied Kant. Freiburg i. B. June 7, 1892. JAMES H. TUFTS. I. TELEOLOGY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY BEFORE KANT. 1. Modern science and philosophy in breaking with scholasticism, found themselves in doubt as to what they should do with the doctrine of final causes. This hesitation was quite independent of the theological consequences, or of the general scientific position of the investigator. Descartes, for whom the guaranty for the trustworthiness of his science lies in the confidence that God will not deceive, is for rejecting utterly the consideration of final causes. Our mind is incapable of understanding all the ends that God may have in creation and hence we must wholly reject the search for final causes.1 Still less is it possible to say that God has made all for our sake, though such a pious thought might excite greater gratitude on our part.2 Nor can we assume to understand some of God's ends without presuming to grasp all, omnes enim in imperscrutabile ejus sapientiæ abysso sunt eodem modo reconditi."3 From the uses of parts of plants and animals we may recognize and praise God, the workman, but cannot divine his end.1 2. Gassendi, on the other hand, the reviver of Epicureanism, whose theology has very slight relation to his science, by no means shares the opinion of Descartes. He affirms that though we may not understand all God's ends, there are some which force 1Cum enim jam sciam naturam meam esse valde infirmam et limitatam, Dei autem naturam esse immensam, incomprehensibilem, infinitam, ex hoc satis etiam scio innumerabilia illum posse quorum causas ignorem; atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus quod a fine peti solet, in rebus phyicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto posse investigare fines Dei. Med. IV. See also Princip. I. 28 and III. 2. 2 Prin. III. 3. Resp. V. de iis quae in Med. IV. 1. • Ibid. |
